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I Introduction
I was appointed Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) in 1997. I have enjoyed just about every aspect
of my work-except unpublished opinions.' I feel as though the issue is
stalking me. On the day that I became Reporter, the issue of unpublished
opinions was the most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee's agenda.
Eight years later, the issue of unpublished opinions continues to be the most
controversial issue on the Advisory Committee's agenda. I have devoted more
* St. Thomas More Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) School of Law,
and Reporter, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The views
expressed in this Article are mine alone and not necessarily those of the Advisory Committee or
any of its present or former members. I am grateful to the many federal appellate judges and
appellate lawyers who spoke with me "off the record" about the subject ofthis Article. I am also
grateful to Stephen R. Barnett, Judge Michael Boudin, Stephen B. Burbank, Edward H. Cooper,
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, and Judge Carl E. Stewart for their comments on a draft of this Article and
to Jessica Nelson, Katharine Nilan, and Erika Toftness for their research assistance.
1. "Unpublished opinions" is, of course, a misnomer, given that many unpublished
opinions are published (in the FederalAppendix and elsewhere). But it is also a term of art that
is widely understood to refer to opinions that are not published in the FederalReporter. TIM
REAGAN ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE

FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 22 (2005). Most (although not all) circuits treat their unpublished

opinions as "non-precedential"-that is, as not establishing a precedent that any court is bound
to follow or even to consult in future cases. For specific circuit rules regarding unpublished
opinions, see infra notes 5-7.
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attention to the unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the
Advisory Committee has faced-combined.2 At times, I have devoted more
attention to the unpublished-opinions issue than to all of my childrencombined. An Advisory Committee member once joked that my obituary
would be unpublished.
The federal courts of appeals take three approaches to regulating the
citation of unpublished opinions. Four "restrictive",4 circuits--the Second,
Seventh, Ninth, and Federal-ban it altogether.' Six "discouraging" circuitsthe First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh-permit it in limited
circumstances (typically, when no published opinion adequately addresses the
same issue as the unpublished opinion). 6 Three "permissive" circuits-the
2. There is one possible exception. I may have spent more time on the complicated and
important (but dull) problems created by the interaction of the provision in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 54 defining "judgment," the provision in FRCP 58 requiring entry of a
judgment on a separate document, and the provision in FRAP 4(a)(7) defining when ajudgment
is entered for purposes of FRAP. Those problems were most recently addressed by the 2002
amendments to those three rules. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MLER, EDwARD H.
COOPER& PATRICK J. SCHILTZ, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.2, at 23-29 (3d ed.
Supp.2005).
3. The phrase "citation of unpublished opinions" refers to the citation of unpublished
opinions in unrelated cases. No circuit bars all citation of unpublished opinions; all circuits
allow the parties to a particular case to cite unpublished opinions that were issued in related
cases to support an assertion of claim or issue preclusion, to support a claim of double jeopardy,
or for similar "case-specific" purposes. Circuits differ, however, in the extent to which they
allow parties to cite unpublished opinions that were issued in unrelated cases.
4. The categorization and terminology are taken from the Federal Judicial Center's (FJC)
recent study on unpublished opinions. REAGAN ET AL., supranote 1, at 1. For more on the FJC,
see infra note 17. For more on its study, see infra text accompanying notes 146-60.
5. See 2D CR.R. 0.23 ("Since these statements do not constitute formal opinions of the
court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited or
otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court."); 7TH CIR.R. 53(b)(2)(iv), (e)
("Unpublished orders: [e]xcept to support a claim ofresjudicata, collateral estoppel or law of
the case, shall not be cited or used as precedent in any federal court within the circuit in any
written document or in oral argument; or by any such court for any purpose."); 9TH CIR.R. 363(b) ("Unpublished decisions and orders of this Court may not be cited to or by the courts of
this circuit, except... when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or
collateral estoppel ...to show double jeopardy ...[or] to demonstrate the existence of a
conflict among... dispositions."); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) ("An opinion or order which is
designated as not to be cited as precedent is one determined by the panel issuing it as not adding
significantly to the body of law. Any opinion or order so designated must not be employed or
cited as precedent.").
6. See 1ST CIR. R. 32.3(a)(2) ("Citation of an unpublished opinion of this court is
disfavored. Such an opinion may be cited only if (1) the party believes that the opinion
persuasively addresses a material issue in the appeal; and (2) there is no published opinion from
this court that adequately addresses this issue."); 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) ("Citation of this Court's
unpublished dispositions in briefs and oral arguments in this Court and in the district courts
within this Circuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or
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Third, Fifth, and D.C.-freely permit it. 7 Thus, nine of the thirteen circuits (the
six discouraging circuits and the three permissive circuits) permit the citation of
unpublished opinions in at least some circumstances, but ten of the thirteen
circuits (the four restrictive circuits and the six discouraging circuits) prohibit
the citation of unpublished opinions in at least some circumstances.
In 2003, the Advisory Committee published for comment a proposal to
add a new Rule 32.1 to FRAP.8 Rule 32.1 would require the federal courts of
the law of the case."); 6TH CIR. R. 28(g) (same); 8TH CR. R. 28A(i) ("Unpublished opinions...
are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them. When relevant to establishing the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite
any unpublished opinion."); OTa CR. R. 36.3(B) ("Citation of an unpublished decision is
disfavored. But an unpublished decision may be cited if: (1) it has persuasive value with
respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it would
assist the court in its disposition."); 11TH CR. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent. They may be cited as persuasive authority, provided that a copy
of the unpublished opinion is attached.... ").
7. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.7 ("The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential
opinions as authority."); 5TH CiR. R. 47.5.4 ("An unpublished opinion may be cited, but if cited
in any document being submitted to the court, a copy of the unpublished opinion must be
attached to each document."); D.C. CiR. R. 28(c)(1) ("All unpublished orders or judgments of
this court, including explanatory memoranda (but not including sealed opinions) entered on or
after January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent.").
8. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30-39 (2003) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
DRAYr]. As published, proposed Rule 32.1 provided as follows:
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
(a)
Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the
citation ofjudicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that
have been designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential,"
"not precedent," or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is generally
imposed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order, judgment, or
other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic
database must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or other
written disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Id. at 31-32. The Advisory Committee has continued to tinker with the wording of proposed
Rule 32.1. As of this writing, the proposed rule provides as follows:
Rule 32.1. Citing Judicial Dispositions
(a)
Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not
precedent," or the like.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, judgment,
or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic
database, the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or
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appeals to freely permit parties to cite unpublished opinions in their briefs and
other submissions. Rule 32.1 would thus impose one rule-a rule that reflects
the practice of the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits-on all of the circuits. The
Advisory Committee received over 500 written comments about Rule 32.1. I
do not have much to say about the merits of the rule. No one could have much
new or important to say about the merits of a rule that has already been the
subject of over 500 comments submitted by some of the best legal minds in
America. Rather, I would like to discuss an interesting question about the
controversy surrounding the proposed rule. The question is: Why is there
controversy surrounding the proposed rule?
Consider the following two seemingly contradictory facts. First, Rule 32.1
has attracted a great deal of highly emotional support and opposition. The
comments that were submitted on Rule 32.1 were the second-most ever
submitted on a proposed amendment to a rule of practice and procedure. 9 One
need only read a few of those public comments'-or a few of the dozens of
articles l l that have been published on the general topic of unpublished
disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May
6, 2005) [hereinafter Aiito Memorandum 2005], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Reports/AP5-2005.pdf.
The Advisory Committee has also continued to tinker with the wording of the Advisory
Committee Note accompanying Rule 32.1. This Article will quote the version of the Note that
was published in 2003. For the 2003 version and accompanying Committee Note, see
PRELIMINARY DRAFT,

supra, at 32-39.

9. The staff of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) told me that
only the 1993 amendment of FRCP 30 resulted in more public comments. The original version
of FRCP 30 permitted the nonstenographic recording of a deposition only on the stipulation of
all parties. The amended version authorizes the party taking the deposition to select the method
of recording. The nation's court reporters campaigned vigorously-and unsuccessfullyagainst the change by submitting hundreds of pre-printed postcards.
10. Public Comments, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1,
http://www.secretjustice.org/public-comments_re_frap_32_l.htm (last modified Apr. 18,2004).
11. In the last few years, Professor Stephen R. Barnett has probably written the most and
the best on the topic of unpublished opinions. E.g., Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to
Hart to West's FederalAppendix: The GroundShifts UnderNo-CitationRules, 4 J.APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 1 (2002) [hereinafter Barnett, GroundShifts]; Stephen R. Barnett, In Support of
ProposedFederalRule of Appellate Procedure32.1: A Reply to Judge Alex Kozinski, FED.
LAW., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 32; Stephen R. Barnett, No-CitationRules UnderSiege: A Battlefield
Report andAnalysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, Under Siege];
Stephen R. Bamett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, JudicialConference
Rulemaking, andFederalPublicDefenders, 62 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1491 (2005) [hereinafter
Barnett, Dog That Did Not Bark].
Many other scholars have written insightfully on the subject, including (to cite just a few
examples from just the past two years): Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects ofNo-Citation

MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE

1433

opinions-to appreciate the depth of feeling surrounding the issue. One federal
appellate judge nicely captured that depth of feeling when he told me that
trying to talk to his colleagues about Rule 32.1 was "like trying to talk to them
about sex or religion."
Second, Rule 32.1 is not sex or religion. Rule 32.1 is not even an
important rule. Numerous jurisdictions have abolished or liberalized nocitation rules, and, to my knowledge, not a shred of evidence indicates that it
has made much difference, one way or another. I am confident that the average
American-even the average judge or lawyer-would agree that the citation of
unpublished opinions does not rank with sex or religion as a topic worthy of
controversy. Indeed, I suspect that the average American would have stronger
feelings about whether we should continue to recognize September 17 as
National Apple Dumpling Day than about whether judges and lawyers should
be able to cite unpublished opinions.
Why, then, the controversy? Why have so many people-brilliant,
accomplished people-gotten so worked up over whether courts should be able
to bar the citation of unpublished opinions? This is a question that has puzzled
me since I was appointed Reporter. I understand the arguments for Rule 32.1.
I understand the arguments against Rule 32.1. What I do not understand is why

Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555 (2005); Richard B. Cappalli, The
Common Law's Case Against Non-PrecedentialOpinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755 (2003);
Lawrence J. Fox, Those UnpublishedOpinions: An AppropriateExpedience or an Abdication
ofResponsibility?, 32 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1215 (2004); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, LegalFictionof
the "Unpublished"Kind The SurrealParadoxof No-CitationRules and the Ethical Duty of
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REv. 27 (2005); Alex Kozinski, In Oppositionto ProposedFederal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, FED. LAW., June 2004, at 36 [hereinafter Kozinski, In
Opposition]; Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); Penelope Pether, InequitableInjunctions: The ScandalofPrivate
Judgingin the US. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2004); Michael B.W. Sinclair, Anastasoff
Versus Hart: The Constitutionalityand Wisdom of Denying PrecedentialAuthority to Circuit
Court Decisions, 64 U. PmTT. L. REv. 695 (2003); Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and
Not Men: ProhibitingNon-precedentialOpinions by Statute or ProceduralRule, 79 IND. L.J.
711 (2004); Norman R. Williams, The Failingsof Originalism: The Federal Courts and the
Powerof Precedent,37 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 761 (2004).
All those who write on the topic of unpublished opinions are indebted to the seminal work
of William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman. E.g., William L. Reynolds & William M.
Richman, An Evaluation ofLimited Publicationin the United States Courts of Appeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Price of
Reform]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publicationin the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The NonPrecedentialPrecedent-LimitedPublication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, NonPrecedential].
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Rule 32.1 stirs such passions. And I say this as someone who has had to blink
back tears while arguing about the designated-hitter rule.
To help figure out this puzzle, I talked with about a dozen highly regarded
federal judges. They included both supporters and opponents of Rule 32.1, and
together they represented about three-quarters of the circuits. I also spoke to
about a dozen highly regarded appellate practitioners. 12 The judges and
lawyers agreed that there was a "disconnect" between the relatively low level of
importance of Rule 32.1 and the relatively high level of emotion surrounding it
(characterized by one judge as "a tempest in a thimble"). But they had widely
differing explanations for that disconnect. Before I provide my own
explanation, I will describe the recent history of Rule 32.1 as context for that
explanation.
I. The Recent History of Rule 32.1
The early history of unpublished opinions is well described elsewhere. 3 I
will briefly mention only a few of the highlights. In 1964, the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Judicial Conference) 14 resolved "[t]hat the
judges of the courts of appeals... authorize the publication of only those
opinions which are of general precedential value."' 5 The Judicial Conference
was motivated by concern over "the rapidly growing number of published
opinions... and the ever increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of
establishing and maintaining accessible private and public law library
facilities.' 6 In 1972, the Judicial Conference, on the recommendation of the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC), 17 asked "each circuit to develop an opinion
12. I promised all of the judges and lawyers to whom I spoke that I would not disclose
their identities.
13. E.g., Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential,supra note 11, at 1168-72.
14. The Judicial Conference is the policy-making ann of the federal judiciary. It is
headed by the Chief Justice of the United States and consists of twenty-seven members: the
Chief Justice, the chiefjudges of the thirteen courts of appeals, the chiefjudge of the Court of
International Trade, and a district judge from each of the twelve geographic circuits. 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (2000). The Conference typically meets twice each year to address a wide range of
matters, id., including proposed amendments to the rules of practice and procedure, see infra 28
(describing the Rules Enabling Act and the procedure for rulemaking).
15. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 16-17, 1964, at 11 (1964).

16.
17.

Id.
See BD. OF THE FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT TO THE APRIL
1972 MEETING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4-7 (1972) (outlining the
Board's recommendations and explaining the reasons for the recommendations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The FJC is the major research and training arm of the
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publication plan."'18 After all of the circuits had done so, the Judicial
Conference reported in 1974 that:
There are in effect Illegal laboratories[ 19] accumulating experience and
amending their publication plans on the basis of that experience. Because
the possible rewards of such experimentation are so rich, the Conference
agreed that it should not be discontinued until there is considerably more
experience under the diverse circuit plans.... [Flurther experimentation
may well lead to the amendment of the diverse circuit plans20 and...
eventually a somewhat more or less common plan might evolve.
And there the matter stood for about fifteen years.
The more recent chapter of the unpublished-opinions saga began with the
Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC), which Congress created in 1988 and
charged with studying the American judicial system and making
recommendations for improvement. 2' In its 1990 report,22 the FCSC expressed
concern about the "many problems" created by "non-publication policies and
non-citation rules. 2 3 The FCSC recounted that no-citation rules had been
justified, in part, by the desire "to keep those with better access to [unpublished
opinions] from having an unfair advantage. 2 4 The FCSC noted, though, that
"inexpensive database access and computerized search technologies may justify
revisiting the issue [of forbidding citation to unpublished opinions], because
these developments may now or soon will provide wide and inexpensive access
federal judiciary. Among its purposes are "to conduct research and study of the operation of the
courts of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1) (2000), and "to develop and present for
consideration by the Judicial Conference of the United States recommendations for
improvement of the administration and management of the courts of the United States," id.
§ 620(b)(2).
18. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
APRIL 6-7, 1972, at 33 (1972).

19. At the time the Judicial Conference wrote its report, there were only eleven federal
courts of appeals-the First through Tenth Circuits and the D.C. Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit
was split off from the Fifth Circuit in 1981. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The
Federal Circuit was created in 1982. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
20. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 7-8, 1974, at 12 (1974).

21. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing the FCSC and outlining
its duties).
22. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
(1990).

23.
24.

Id. at 130.
Id.
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to all opinions. '2 5 The FCSC recommended that a committee working under
the auspices of the Judicial Conference "should review policy on unpublished
court opinions in light of increasing ease and decreasing cost of database
access."26
The Judicial Conference did not agree and voted to oppose the
recommendation of the FCSC. 2 That vote should have ended the matter, as no
amendment to FRAP can be promulgated through the Rules Enabling Act
process without the approval of the Judicial Conference, 28 and the Judicial
Conference made clear that it did not even want to study the issue of
unpublished opinions. 29 But the unpublished-opinions issue is as resilient as a
vampire.
Just a few short months after the Judicial Conference determined that it
did not want to ask a committee to study the issue of unpublished opinions, the
Local Rules Project (Project) recommended that the Judicial Conference ask a
committee to study the issue of unpublished opinions. The Project was
authorized by the Judicial Conference in 198430 and operated under the
auspices of the Standing Committee. 31 The Project was a massive, multi-year
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 130.

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
SEPTEMBER 12, 1990, at 88 (1990) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 1990 REPORT].

28. The Rules Enabling Act (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)) established
the basic procedural framework for amending the rules of practice and procedure (including
FRAP). Today, the process typically includes eight steps: (1) The advisory committee
recommends the proposed amendment for publication. (2) The Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (commonly known as the "Standing Committee") approves the proposed
amendment for publication. (3) The proposed amendment is published, and public comment is
received. (4) The advisory committee, after reviewing the public comment, approves the
proposed amendment. (5) The Standing Committee approves the proposed amendment. (6) The
Judicial Conference approves the proposed amendment at its fall meeting. (7) The Supreme
Court approves the proposed amendment by the following May 1. (8) The proposed amendment
takes effect on December 1, unless Congress passes legislation blocking it. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (2000) (outlining the procedure and powers involved in rulemaking); ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: A SUMMARY FOR THE BENCH AND BAR

(2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (summarizing the process of
rulemaking and the responsibilities of those individuals involved in the process).
29. See SEPTEMBER 1990 REPORT, supra note 27, at 88 (rejecting recommendation to
review policy on unpublished opinions).
30. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
SEPTEMBER 19-20, 1984, at 67 (1984) (recording the Conference's decision to begin the study);
Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role ofLocal Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (discussing the
problems with the difficult systems of local rules and describing the procedure to implement
change).
31. The Judicial Conference is empowered by 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000) to "authorize
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undertaking, involving a close review of the 5000-plus local rules in effect in
the federal courts at the time. 32 The Project aimed to identify topics that were
the subject of conflicting local rules and therefore appropriate targets of future
national rulemaking. The Project recommended that the Advisory Committee
consider amending FRAP to implement national rules regarding the publication
of opinions.33
The Standing Committee asked the Advisory Committee to comment on
the Project's recommendation. In early 1992, after surveying the circuits, the
Advisory Committee reported back to the Standing Committee that it was
split. 34 Some Advisory Committee members were reluctant to consider a
proposal on a subject that the Judicial Conference had so recently declined even
to study. Other members, however, "believed that the change in technology has
changed circumstances to such an extent that a new look at the policy would be
timely. 3 5 These latter members prevailed, and the issue of unpublished
opinions was added to the Advisory Committee's study agenda as Item No. 9117.
When a film project languishes for years in Hollywood, it is said to be in
"development hell."3 6 After being placed on the Advisory Committee's study
agenda, Item No. 91-17 languished in "rulemaking hell." Years went by
without the Advisory Committee discussing Item No. 91-17, much less acting
on it. The Advisory Committee was otherwise occupied. The Standing
Committee had decided that the rules of practice and procedure should be
"restyled"-that is, rewritten from top to bottom in plain English and according
to consistent style conventions37-and chose the Appellate Rules to undergo
the appointment of a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence." The
Standing Committee is charged with reviewing the recommendations of the advisory committees
and recommending changes in the rules of practice and procedure to the Judicial Conference.
Supra note 28.
32. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT (1989) (examining the rules of the ninety-four
federal district courts).
33. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETrE & MARY P. SQUIERS, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES
PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON APPELLATE PRACTICE 68 (1991) (recommending that the Committee
amend or add an appellate rule regarding a national uniform plan for opinion publication).
34. Memorandum from the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 14 (Jan. 8,
1992) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. Id.
36. DAVID HUGHES, TALES FROM DEVELOPMENT HELL: HOLLYWOOD FILM-MAKING THE
HARD WAY 10 (2004).
37. For more on the restyling project, see Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the CivilRules:
Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1761 (2004) and Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines
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restyling first.38 Thus, in the mid-1990s, the attention of the Advisory
Committee and its Reporter, Professor Carol Ann Mooney, was focused on the
restyling project. They did outstanding work, but the inevitable consequence of
the restyling project was that little work could be done on the rest of the
Advisory Committee's agenda-including Item No. 91-17. 39
The Advisory Committee completed its work on the restyling project in
1997. That same year, both Judge James K. Logan's highly successful term as
Chair of the Advisory Committee and Professor Mooney's equally successful
tenure as Reporter to the Advisory Committee ended. A new chair (Judge Will
Garwood) and reporter (yours truly) were appointed by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist. The first item of business for the Advisory Committee was to
hack through the backlog of agenda items that had accumulated while FRAP
was being restyled.
The hacking started at the Advisory Committee's September 1997
meeting. The Advisory Committee discussed Item No. 91-17 at length and
ultimately agreed to give the matter further study.40 As a first step, Judge
Garwood decided to survey the chiefjudges of the circuits to get some sense of

for Draftingand Editing CourtRules, 169 F.R.D. 176 (1997).
38. The restyled Appellate Rules took effect on December 1, 1998, and the restyled
Criminal Rules on December 1, 2002. The restyled Civil Rules have been published for
comment. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (2005), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Prelimdrafl_proposed_ptl .pdf.
39. The only significant event related to the citation of unpublished opinions that occurred
during this period was the Judicial Conference's adoption of a long-range plan for the federal
courts in 1995. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. That plan included the recommendation that
"[a] uniform set of procedures and mechanisms for access to court of appeals opinions,
guidelines for publication or distribution, and clearstandardsfor citation should be developed."
Id. at 69 (emphasis added). In the plan, the Judicial Conference described the recommendation
of the FCSC that a committee should study citation standards, FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
supra note 22, at 130-31, and noted that the circuits had been adopting different citation rules,
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra,at 69. The Judicial Conference described standards governing the
citation of unpublished opinions as being "in flux" and said that the issue "clearly... requires
study and assessment." Id. at 70. The Judicial Conference did not note that, just five years
earlier, it had rejected the FCSC's recommendation and refused to give the issue "study and
assessment." Id.; see SEPTEMBER 1990 REPORT, supra note 27, at 88 (opposing the FCSC's
recommendation that an ad hoc committee review the policy on unpublished opinions).
40. Minutes of the Fall 1997 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 912 (Sept. 29, 1997). The minutes of all of the recent meetings of the Advisory Committee (and
of the Standing Committee and the other advisory committees) are available on the website
maintained by the AO. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Minutes of Committee
Meetings, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm (last visited July 6, 2005).
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whether the Judicial Conference's views on this matter might have changed in
41
the past eight years.
On January 28, 1998, Judge Garwood wrote to each of the thirteen chief
judges and invited them to respond to the following questions:
1. Should the courts of appeals continue to designate some opinions as
"unpublished"?
2. If so, should FRAP be amended to specify the criteria that should be
used in determining whether an opinion is designated as "unpublished"?
3. Should FRAP be amended to either mandate or forbid the submission
of "unpublished" opinions to Westlaw, LEXIS, and similar services for
electronic dissemination?
4. Should FRAP be amended to specify the circumstances, if any, under
which "unpublished" opinions may be cited by counsel in their briefs and
other submissions or by courts in their opinions and orders?
to what extent
5. Should FRAP be amended to specify whether and
"unpublished" opinions shall have precedential force? 42
All of the chief judges-save those of the First and Fifth Circuitsresponded to Judge Garwood's letter, as did several of their colleagues. The
chiefjudges were almost unanimous-and, in some cases, quite vehement-in
their view that the Advisory Committee should not propose rules addressing
any of these issues.43 Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit
captured the attitude of the judges when he stated, in response to the fourth
question: "This is a terrible idea." 44 Several judges simply said that they
agreed with Chief Judge Edwards.45 Others, such as Judge Edward E. Canes
41.

The chiefjudges make up almost half of the voting membership of the Conference.

Supra note 14.
42. E.g., Letter from Will Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to
Harry T. Edwards, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Jan. 28, 1998) 1-2
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See Minutes of the Spring 1998 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, pt. V.C, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0498appellateminutes.htm (Apr. 16,
1998) [hereinafter Spring 1998 Minutes] (reporting the judges' responses to the questions).
44. Letter from Harry T. Edwards, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, to William L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 2 (Feb. 4,
1998) [hereinafter Edwards Letter] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See, e.g., Letter from Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, to William L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1
(Feb. 20, 1998) ("I am in complete agreement with the views of Chief Judge Edwards."); Letter
from Joseph W. Hatchett, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to
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of the Eleventh Circuit, added a few words just to make sure the Advisory
Committee got the point: "Amending FRAP to address unpublished opinions
and attempting to force a uniform practice upon circuits in this area would be a
terrible idea.",46 On March 11, 1998, Judge Garwood met with the chiefjudges
in Washington, D.C. to seek additional input from them on the questions that
he had posed in his January 28 letter. Again, the chief judges were adamant
that FRAP should not be amended to address the citation of unpublished
opinions (or any of the other issues raised in Judge Garwood's letter).47
The Advisory Committee next met in April 1998. At that meeting, Judge
Garwood argued that Item No. 91-17 should be removed from the Advisory
Committee's study agenda and that the Advisory Committee should give no
further attention to the issue of unpublished opinions.4 8 Although Judge
Garwood said that he personally would favor a rule providing that unpublished
opinions could be cited, 49 he urged the Advisory Committee to bow to political
reality:
Judge Garwood pointed out that the chiefjudges make up half of the voting
membership of the Judicial Conference, and that the other halfof the voting
membership-district court judges from each circuit-was likely to defer to
the chiefjudges on this matter. It is thus clear to Judge Garwood that rules
regarding unpublished decisions have no chance of clearing the Judicial
Conference in the foreseeable future.50
The Advisory Committee deliberated about Judge Garwood's
recommendation. Mostly, the deliberations focused on the questions that seem
William L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 17, 1998) ("I
agree completely with Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards's responses in his letter of February 4,
1998."); Letter from Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
to William L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Mar. 2, 1998)

("[O]ur Executive Committee concurs in the conclusions reached by the D.C. Circuit."); Letter
from Dolores K. Sloviter, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to William
L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 12, 1998) ("I agree
wholeheartedly with the comments expressed by Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards in his letter of
February 4, 1998.") (all letters on file the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. Letter from Ed Carnes, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
to Will L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 19, 1998) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. See Spring 1998 Minutes, supranote 43, at pt. V.C (stating that the chiefjudges were
almost unanimous in their opposition to the Committee proposing rules governing unpublished
opinions).
48. Id.
49. See id.(noting that Judge Garwood doubted the wisdom and constitutionality of local
rules that bar citation to unpublished opinions).
50. Id.
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to arise whenever the topic of unpublished opinions is discussed, such as the
question of whether unpublished opinions contain anything of value or whether
barring citation to unpublished opinions is necessary to prevent wealthy
litigants from having an advantage over poor litigants. 5 1 But two aspects of the
Advisory Committee's discussion are worth noting. First, a substantial part of
the discussion addressed the practice of the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
of refusing to make their unpublished opinions available to Westlaw and
LEXIS. That issue so concerned the Advisory Committee that Judge Garwood
eventually agreed to appoint a subcommittee "to discuss whether and how the
Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits might be encouraged to provide their
unpublished opinions to LEXIS and Westlaw. 5 2 The subcommittee never
met. 3 Second, the Solicitor General's representative (joined later in the day by
the Solicitor General himself) argued that, notwithstanding the opposition of
the chief judges, the Advisory Committee should go forward with a proposed
rule "providing that unpublished opinions may be cited."5 4 The Solicitor
General's views did not carry the day--or, at least, that day. The Advisory
Committee agreed unanimously-although, in the case of some members
(including the Solicitor General), quite
reluctantly--that Item No. 91-17 should
55
be removed from the study agenda.
Again, that should have been the end of the matter, but again the
unpublished-opinions issue would not die. Less than three years later the issue
was put back on the Advisory Committee's agenda by the Solicitor General.
On January 16, 2001-four days before the end of the Clinton
Administration--outgoing Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman wrote to Judge
Garwood and formally proposed "the adoption of a new provision in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that would establish uniform national
56
standards governing the citation of unpublished court of appeals decisions."
On the issue of citing unpublished opinions, the Solicitor General apparently
refused to take "no" for an answer.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Third and Fifth Circuits soon changed their practices, and the Eleventh Circuit
was forced to change its practice by Section 205 of the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 2005)). Section
205(a) requires every federal court to maintain a website and to make available on that website
"the substance of all written opinions issued by the court." Id.§ 205(a)(5).
54. Spring 1998 Minutes, supranote 43, at pt. V.C.

55. Id.
56. Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, to Will Garwood, Chair, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Waxman Letter] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The Solicitor General's proposal was added to the Advisory Committee's
agenda as Item No. 01-01. 7 Although the proposal eventually led to the
publication of Rule 32.1, it is important to note that what the Solicitor General
proposed differed significantly from what eventually became Rule 32.1.
Likewise, it is important to note that what seemed to be motivating the Solicitor
General in January 2001 was different from what seems to be motivating the
Advisory Committee today.
The rule proposed by the Solicitor General began by providing that the
citation of unpublished opinions "is disfavored. 5 8 The rule allowed citation
only "to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case,
double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, abuse of the writ, notice, or similar
doctrines." 59 Otherwise, the rule would have barred the citation of an
unpublished opinion, unless "a party believes" both that the unpublished
opinion "persuasively addresses a material issue in the appeal" and that
"no
60
published opinion of the forum court adequately addresses the issue."
The Solicitor General's letter to Judge Garwood made clear that the
Solicitor General's proposal was motivated by two concerns: uniformity and
clarity. The Solicitor General said that he wanted to make life easier for
attorneys who practice in more than one circuit (such as the Department of
Justice attorneys) by eliminating the need to learn and follow various local
circuit rules on whether and when unpublished opinions may be cited. 6 1 The
Solicitor General also wanted to clarify the law, which, he said, "leaves
litigators substantially uncertain concerning how to treat an unpublished
decision issued by a court that... [permits citation of its own unpublished
decisions] (such as the Fifth Circuit), when litigating in a court (such as the
Ninth Circuit), that prohibits citation of its own unpublished decisions but62does
not specifically address the citation of decisions issued by other courts."
Thus, the Solicitor General did not object to the content of the local circuit
rules that barred or restricted the citation of unpublished opinions; he objected
57. The Solicitor General's proposal appears as Item No. 00-14 in both the agenda for the
Advisory Committee's April 2001 meeting and in the minutes of that meeting. In all other
Advisory Committee records, it appears as Item No. 01-01. This confuses researchers, who
occasionally ask me for an explanation. I do not have one. Somehow I made a mistake.
58. Waxman Letter, supranote 56, app. at 1.

59.

Id.

60. Id. The draft rule also would have required that a party must attach to its brief or
other filing a copy of any unpublished opinion cited by the party-even if the unpublished
opinion had appeared in the FederalAppendix or was available online. Id.
61. See id. at 3 (noting that the current rules result in uncertainty and confusion for
lawyers).
62. Id. (footnote omitted).
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only to the lack of uniformity and clarity. Moreover, far from taking issue with
the notion that a court could discourage litigants from citing unpublished
opinions, the Solicitor General stressed in his draft Advisory Committee Note
that "parties should look to unpublished decisions only as a last resort" and that
his proposed rule "does not dispense with the basic rule that unpublished
decisions normally should not be cited., 63 Indeed, the Solicitor General's
proposed rule would have forced the three circuits that do not ban or limit the
citation ofunpublished opinions to begin doing so. No soaring language about
free speech, judicial accountability, or the rule of law here!
The Solicitor General's proposal was discussed at the April 2001 meeting
of the Advisory Committee at the end of a very long day. Both Judge Garwood
and I argued that the Solicitor General's proposal should be removed from the
study agenda. 64 I recounted the history described above (several members had
joined the Advisory Committee since the unpublished-opinions issue had last
been discussed) and argued that "it would be a waste of this Committee's
time-and perhaps risk the appearance of a lack of respect for the chiefjudges
who responded to Judge Garwood's 1998 letter-to take up this precise
proposal again just three years later., 65 Judge Garwood agreed. He described
his March 1998 meeting with the chief judges and said that, "in light of the
recent and vehemently negative reaction of the chief judges, he did not think
' 66
this Committee should even 'stick its toe' in this area."
In response, the Solicitor General's representative and other Advisory
Committee members argued that the attitude of the chief judges might have
changed since they were last polled in 1998.67 These members pointed out that
some circuits were now led by different chief judges and speculated that the
thinking of the chief judges may have changed in light ofAnastasoffv. United
States,68 the controversial (and later vacated) Eighth Circuit decision holding
that a federal court is constitutionally required to treat all of its prior
decisions-published or not-as precedent.69 The discussion did not progress
63. Id.app. at 2.
64. Minutes of Spring 2001 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 64-65
(Apr. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Spring 2001 Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/app040l.pdf.
65. Id. at64.
66. Id. at 65.
67. Id.
68. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d
1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
69. Id. at 899. Saying that a decision of a court must be treated as "precedent" raises as
many questions as it answers, for there has long been disagreement about how a federal (or
state) court must (or should) treat its prior decisions. In an article published shortly after
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very far, though, as it was after 5:00 p.m., and Advisory Committee members
had planes to catch. The Advisory Committee agreed to continue the
discussion at its next meeting.7 °
The Advisory Committee did not meet again until April 2002. 7' In the
intervening year, Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr. succeeded Judge Garwood as
Chair of the Advisory Committee, and Theodore B. Olson succeeded Waxman
as Solicitor General. On February 22, 2002, in preparation for the upcoming
meeting of the Advisory Committee, Judge Alito sent a copy of the Solicitor
General's proposal to the chief judges of the circuits and asked for their
comments.72 The chief judges of the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits did
not respond; the responses of the other chief judges were all over the lot. The
chief judges of the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits expressed support for
the proposal; 73 the chiefjudges of the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal

Anastasoff was decided, Polly J. Price-a former law clerk to Judge Richard S. Arnold,
Anastasoff s author--describes how judges and scholars have differed over issues such as to
what extent courts are bound to follow their precedents and under what circumstances courts
may overrule their precedents. Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 108-17 (2000). Price argues, though, that "prior to the
appearance of the non-citation rules at issue in Anastasoff,no one had suggested that courts
should not at least begin their reasoning process with prior decided cases." Id.at 93. According
to Price, "Anastasoffdoes not require that courts subscribe to any one particular theory of the
bindingnature of precedent," id. at 108, but rather requires merely that "[t]he decisionmaking
process at least begin!] from prior precedent, whether the court then considers itself 'bound' by
precedent [or] able to 'overrule' precedent," id. at 109. By "begin[ning] from prior precedent,"
id. at 109, Price means that courts must "at a minimum... take note of the prior determination
and explain any choice to decide the matter differently," id. at 85.
When I refer to a decision being treated as "precedent" or "binding precedent," I am using
what Price describes as the "traditional" definition ofprecedent-"that the holding of a case...
must either be followed, distinguished, or overruled." Id. at 86. I use the traditional definition
not because I somehow endorse it-I do not know enough to take a position-but because the
judges and lawyers who refer to "precedent" or "binding precedent" in the debate over Rule 32.1
generally are using the traditional definition.
70. Spring 2001 Minutes, supra note 64, at 65.
71. The meeting scheduled for November 2001 was cancelled as a result of the September
11 attacks.
72. E.g., Letter from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
to R. Lanier Anderson, III, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Feb.
22, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. Letter from R. Lanier Anderson, III, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Feb.
26, 2002); Letter from Edward R. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Mar. 4,2002);
Letter from Deanell Reece Tacha, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Mar. 27,2002) (all letters
on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

MUCHADO ABOUT LITTLE

1445

Circuits expressed opposition; 74 the chiefjudge of the Sixth Circuit stated that
his circuit was "not inclined to change the way... [it] proceed[s]"; 75 and the
chiefjudge of the Fifth Circuit said that the judges of her circuit were divided.76
It is critical to remember that the proposal reviewed by these chief judges was
the Solicitor General's, which would have restrictedthe citation of unpublished
opinions in a manner consistent with the local rules of a plurality of the circuits.
The proposal was not Rule 32.1, which forbids courts to discourage or restrict
the citation of unpublished opinions.
Judge Alito reported the results of his survey at the April 2002 meeting of
the Advisory Committee.77 The Solicitor General's representative continued to
press for the approval of his proposal (Olson agreed with his predecessor on the
issue) and pointed to several recent developments that suggested that the
climate was becoming more welcoming to the citation of unpublished
opinions.78 For example, the D.C. Circuit replaced its formerly restrictive rule
with an extremely liberal rule permitting the citation "as precedent" of
unpublished decisions issued on or after January 1, 2002. 7 9 The Third Circuit
also announced a new policy on unpublished opinions. Though the policy
noted that the court itself "does not cite to its not precedential opinions as
authority," the policy placed no restrictions on the ability of parties to cite
unpublished opinions.8 ° And the First Circuit had asked for public comment on
74. Letter from Michael Boudin, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Feb. 26,2002); Letter
from David R. Hansen, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Apr. 1,2002); Letter from Haldane
Robert Mayer, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito,
Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Mar. 12,2002) (all letters on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit and
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III of the Fourth Circuit expressed their opposition in
telephone calls to Judge Alito.
75. Letter from Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Feb. 27,2002)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. Letter from Carolyn Dineen King, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1 (Mar. 15,
2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. Minutes of Spring 2002 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 23 (Apr.
22, 2002) [hereinafter Spring 2002 Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/app0402.pdf.
78. Id. at 24; see also Letter from Douglas Letter, Appellate Litigation Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, to Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
(Mar. 28, 2002) (remarking that recent changes suggested a more open attitude towards the
proposed rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. D.C. C. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
80. 3DCIR.I.O.P. 5.7.
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a proposed local rule-a rule that the court ultimately adopted 8 -that would
have liberalized its no-citation rule.
At the April 2002 meeting, the Advisory Committee debated the Solicitor
General's proposal.8 2 The debate followed a pattern that had already become
familiar and that was to become more familiar in succeeding years. To a
substantial extent, those who favored the rule argued the merits, while those
who opposed the rule cited what might be called political or prudential
concerns. In other words, those who argued in favor of the rule mostly cited
reasons why the rule was a good one-why it was wise as a policy matter.
Those who opposed the rule also argued the merits, but they relied most heavily
on arguments that the rule was unlikely to be approved. Opponents argued that
the Advisory Committee should not invest its time, energy, and "political
capital" in pushing a rule that would spur much controversy and probably not
be approved by the Judicial Conference.
The proponents won. The Advisory Committee voted six to three in favor
of the proposition that FRAP should be amended to include a national rule
regulating the citation of unpublished opinions. 83 The Advisory Committee
then turned to the question of the contents of that rule.84 The primary
disagreement concerned whether the Solicitor General's "middle ground"
proposal should be approved or whether FRAP should be amended to more
broadly provide that no restrictions may be imposed on the citation of
unpublished opinions. An interesting role reversal occurred. Those who had
opposed any national rulemaking on the topic of unpublished opinions argued
that the Advisory Committee should take the broader approach-and mostly
argued the merits. I, among others, argued for the broader approach:
The Reporter argued that, in putting so many conditions upon the
citation of non-precedential decisions, the ...[Solicitor General's
proposal] was undermining the arguments of its proponents. Proponents of
the rule argue... that non-precedential decisions should not be treated any
differently than other types of non-precedential authority, such as the
decisions of state or foreign courts or law review articles. No rule regulates
the citation of these sources; for example, no rule provides that these
sources can only be cited in "support [of] a claim of res judicata" or "if a
party believes that [the authority] persuasively addresses a material issue in
the appeal." By imposing such restrictions on the citation of nonprecedential decisions, the draft rule seems to buy into the notion that there
81.
82.
83.
84.

1STCIR. R. 32.3.

Spring 2002 Minutes, supranote 77, at 24-25.
Id.at 25.
Id.at 25-27.
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is something "wrong" with non-precedential opinions that is not
"wrong"
8
with law review articles or other non-precedential authorities. 1
Those who had favored national rulemaking argued in favor of the
Solicitor General's approach-and mostly argued political or prudential
concerns. Most members seemed to agree that the broader rule would be
preferable on the merits, but they "argued that the restrictions on the citation of
non-published opinions [found in the Solicitor General's draft] were politically
expedient in that they would increase the chances that the rule would be
approved by the Standing Committee and Judicial Conference." 86 After a
lengthy debate, the Advisory Committee voted six to three to approve the
Solicitor General's proposal in principle.87
When a proposed rule has not been drafted by the Reporter, the Advisory
Committee's general practice is to approve the rule in principle and then ask the
Reporter to prepare a "cleaned-up" draft of the rule for the Advisory Committee
to consider at its next meeting. This practice provides the Advisory Committee
an opportunity to give the proposal further thought. It also provides the
Reporter an opportunity to improve the drafting of the proposed rule and write
an Advisory Committee Note to accompany it. The Advisory Committee
followed its usual practice with respect to the Solicitor General's proposal on
unpublished opinions. The Advisory Committee approved the proposal in
principle, but it asked me to present a "cleaned-up" draft at its November 2002
88
meeting.
As that meeting approached, I became increasingly convinced that, if the
Advisory Committee was going to pick a fight over unpublished opinions, it
should at least pick a fight worth fighting. I knew from my experience working
on the unpublished-opinion issue that the opposition to any proposed
amendment would be fierce. It seemed to me that, to have any chance of
approval, the proposal would have to accomplish something more significant
than instructing the four circuits that barred the citation of unpublished
opinions all of the time that they could bar the citation of unpublished opinions
only some of the time-such as when a published opinion would serve just as
well. As the Solicitor General had recognized, the only thing that such a rule
would accomplish is uniformity. In light of the strong opposition that any
rulemaking about unpublished opinions was certain to face, I did not think that
the argument that attorneys should be spared the inconvenience of having to
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.at 26.
Id.
Id.at 27.
Id.
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look up a circuit's rule on citing unpublished opinions (a rule that typically
appears on the face of unpublished opinions) was likely to prevail.
So that the Advisory Committee would have a range of options before it, I
presented three alternative drafts of a proposed Rule 32.1 at the November
2002 meeting. 89 "Alternative A" was the most sweeping. It specifically
authorized courts to issue opinions that were not precedential and permitted the
citation of unpublished opinions without qualification. 90 "Alternative B" was
the second most sweeping. Unlike Alternative A, it addressed only the citation
of unpublished opinions and not their precedential force. However, unlike
"Alternative C," it permitted the citation of such opinions without
qualification. 9' Alternative C was essentially the Solicitor General's original
proposal. It, too, addressed only the citation of unpublished opinions and not
their precedential force, but it permitted such citation only in limited
circumstances.9 2
93
The Advisory Committee quickly decided to reject Alternative A.
Although they recognized that publishing Alternative A might reassure judges
who feared that a rule permitting the citation of unpublished opinions was a
first step in a long-range effort to bar unpublished opinions altogether,
members concluded that the Advisory Committee should not embrace one side
of the debate over the constitutionality of issuing nonprecedential opinions.
Rather, the Advisory Committee decided to limit its involvement to the issue of
citation. To date, the Advisory Committee has not wavered from this position.
The Advisory Committee also quickly determined that Alternative B
represented a better approach than Alternative C. 94 Even the Solicitor
General's representative supported Alternative B. He said that the Solicitor
General had proposed the equivalent of Alternative C only because he had
concluded that a more limited rule had the best chance of being approved by
the Standing Committee and Judicial Conference. But the Solicitor General
agreed that Alternative B was the better approach on the merits and, on
reflection, agreed that it would be better to lead with the best alternative

89. See Minutes of Fall 2002 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 22-35
(Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Fall 2002 Minutes] (describing the three alternative versions of
proposed Rule 32.1 in detail), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app1 102.pdf.
90. Id. at 23-28, 35.
91. Id. at 28-31, 35.
92. Id. at 31-34, 35.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id.
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(Alternative B) and then fall back to the less satisfactory alternative
95
(Alternative C) if the best alternative failed to attract sufficient support.
Back in April 2002, the Advisory Committee had been split six to three
over whether any rule regarding the citation of unpublished opinions should be
approved. 96 At the November 2002 meeting, the Advisory Committee voted
seven to one in favor of Alternative B, with one abstention. 97 The dissenting
vote belonged to Sanford Svetcov, a respected San Francisco appellate litigator
who had supported going forward with the rule in April.9 8 Svetcov explained
that he had received calls from Judge Alex Kozinski and others affiliated with
the Ninth Circuit, and that they had persuaded him that FRAP should not be
amended to address the citation of unpublished opinions. 99 The abstainer was
the Solicitor General's representative. It came as a bit of a surprise that the
Solicitor General abstained on his own proposal. But the Solicitor General's
representative explained that the Solicitor General had also received calls from
Judge Kozinski and other Ninth Circuit judges, and he was troubled by some of
the concerns that they raised.' 00
Before approving Alternative B, the Advisory Committee decided to make
some stylistic changes to the draft that I had presented.' 0' For example, the
Advisory Committee decided that the rule should be written in the passive
voice ("No restriction may be imposed") rather than in the active voice ("A
court must not impose") because the passive voice sounded less confrontational
and thus might create less opposition.1 02 The Advisory Committee also asked
me to make some changes to the Advisory Committee Note10 and
to prepare a
3
final draft of the proposed rule in time for the next meeting.
The Advisory Committee met again in May 2003. Its discussion of Rule
32.1 was brief and focused almost entirely on stylistic issues.'1 4 After making a
95. Id.
96. Spring 2002 Minutes, supra note 77, at 25.
97. Fall 2002 Minutes, supra note 89, at 39.
98. The minutes of the Advisory Committee do not generally disclose who made which
statements or who cast which votes. However, Svetcov has been identified in the legal press as
an opponent of Rule 32.1, see, e.g., Tony Mauro, Green Light to Cite Unpublished Opinions,
LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2004, at 8 (noting that Svetcov describes unpublished opinions as "junk
law"), and he has given me permission to identify him in this Article.
99. Fall 2002 Minutes, supra note 89, at 36.
100. Id. at 35.
101. Id. at 38-39.
102. Id. at 38.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Minutes of Spring 2003 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 11-17
(May 15, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ app05O3.pdf.
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05
couple of minor stylistic changes to the rule and Advisory Committee Note,1
the Advisory Committee approved Rule 32.1 for publication 0with
Svetcov in
6
dissent and the Solicitor General's representative abstaining.1
The next stop for Rule 32.1 was the Standing Committee. No proposed
amendment to FRAP or any of the other rules of practice and procedure can be
published for comment without the approval of the Standing Committee. 0 7 It
is rare, though, that the Standing Committee denies permission to publish.
Rule 32.1 was no exception. At its June 2003 meeting, the Standing
Committee approved the request to publish Rule 32.1 for comment on a
unanimous voice vote after almost no discussion.'0 8
Rule 32.1 and several other proposed amendments were published for
comment in August 2003.'09 The comments received by the Advisory
Committee on this set of proposed amendments were unusual in several
respects. First, the Advisory Committee received an extraordinarily large
number of comments: 513 written comments were submitted,10 and fifteen
witnesses testified at a public hearing on April 13, 2004."' By contrast, a
much more extensive-and, to my mind, more important-set of proposed
amendments published in August 20001 12 attracted twenty written comments
and no requests to testify. Second, the overwhelming majority of the written
comments-about 95%--and all of the live testimony pertained only to Rule
32.1.'13 Most of the other written comments pertained to Rule 32.1 and at least
one other amendment. Only nine of the 513 comments did not mention Rule
32.1 at all.'1 4 Third, most of the comments on Rule 32.1 came from one circuit.
About 75% of all comments (pro and con) regarding Rule 32.1-and about

105. Id. at 16-17.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Supra note 28.
108. Minutes of Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 8-9 (June 910, 2003), availableat http://uscourts.gov/rules/IMinutes/june2003.pdf.
109. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 8, at 1-44.
110. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 1 (May 14, 2004) [hereinafter Alito Memorandum 2004], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ Reports/AP5-2004.pdf.
111. Transcript of Hearing Before Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 3-4 (Apr. 13,
2004) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript].
112.

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-60 (2000).

U.S.,

113.
114.

Alito Memorandum 2004, supra note 110, at 1-2.
Id.
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80% of the comments opposing Rule 32.1--came from judges, clerks, lawyers,
and others who work or formerly worked in the Ninth Circuit. "s Fourth, the
vast majority of the comments on Rule 32.1-about 90 0/o---opposed adopting
the rule. 16 Finally, the comments regarding Rule 32.1 were extremely
repetitive. Obviously, there had been an organized campaign to generate
comments opposing Rule 32.1, as many of those comments repeatedsometimes word-for-word-the same basic "talking points" that had been
distributed by opponents of the rule."17
The Advisory Committee discussed the comments on Rule 32.1 at its
April 2004 meeting." 18 (I have described those comments at length in another
Article. 19) Every Advisory Committee member present-save Svetcov-spoke
in favor of the proposed rule.' 20 It appeared that positions had hardened. The
supporters of Rule 32.1 increasingly spoke about the issue as one of principle,
and they spoke in strong terms:
Committee members argued that the main problem with no-citation rulesand the main reason to approve Rule 32.1-is that an Article III court
should not be able to forbid parties from citing back to it the public actions
that the court itself has taken. It is antithetical to American values and to

the common law system for a court to forbid a party or an attorney from
calling the court's attention to its own prior decisions, from arguing to the
court that its prior decisions were or were not correct, and from arguing that
the court should or should not act consistently with those prior decisions in
the present case. One member called no-citation rules an "extreme"
measure. Another member said that it was "ludicrous" that an attorney

cannot cite a court's prior decisions to the court itself, but can cite those
115.

Id. at 2. For example, of the twenty-one law professors who wrote to oppose Rule

32.1, only two have no obvious Ninth Circuit connection-that is, a Ninth Circuit connection
that appears in their online biography. See id. at 99-100 (listing professors who opposed the
rule). Seventeen of the professors are former Ninth Circuit clerks (eight of those seventeen
clerked for Judge Kozinski), and two others did not clerk on the Ninth Circuit but now teach
there.
116. Id. at2.

117.

Id. These "talking points" were attached to or incorporated in many of the comments.

See, e.g., Eric C. Liebeler, Public Comment 03-AP-025, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 2, 2003) (attaching three pages of talking points entitled "Why Proposed
Rule 32.1 Is A Bad Idea"), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-

AP-025.pdf.
118. Minutes of Spring 2004 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 2-12
(Apr. 13-14, 2004) [hereinafter Spring 2004 Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Minutes/appO4O4.pdf.
119. Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the FederalCourts of
Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 23,30-58 (2005).

120.

Spring 2004 Minutes, supra note 118, at 7.
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decisions to virtually everyone else in the world, including other courts.
Yet another member-a judge-said that judges should not be the only
government officials who can shield themselves from being confronted with
their past actions. 121
Supporters dismissed the "parade of horribles" raised by opponents of
Rule 32.1-such as predictions that it would substantially slow disposition
times and cause courts to issue many more one-line orders disposing of
appeals-by pointing out that many federal and state jurisdictions had already
122
liberalized their no-citation rules without experiencing any of the "horribles."'
The three federal appellate judges on the Advisory Committee (including John
G. Roberts, Jr., now Chief Justice of the United States) all spoke in support of
Rule 32.1. 123 All three judges came from circuits with liberal citation rules (the
D.C., Third, and Fifth Circuits), and all agreed that, as one judge put it, "parties
almost never cite unpublished opinions, and, when
they do, [the courts] are
24
1
citations."
those
with
dealing
of
capable
quite
Only Svetcov argued against approving Rule 32.1. He cited three major
reasons: First, unpublished opinions are "junk law"; 125 they contain little or
nothing of value. Second, federal rulemaking should be a consensus or nearconsensus process. Not only was there no consensus in favor of Rule 32.1, but
126
there was, if anything, a near-consensus against it among the commentators.
Finally, the circuits confront dramatically different challenges in handling their
caseloads and should be free to meet those challenges as they deem appropriate:
"This is an area in which one size does not fit all."' 27
In addition to debating the merits of Rule 32.1, the Advisory Committee
discussed whether it should postpone action on Rule 32.1 and invite the FJC
and AO to study some of the claims made by the commentators. 28 In the end,
most members opposed a postponement, arguing that such a study would be

121. Id. at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. (noting an "overwhelming opposition" to Rule 32.1 among commentators). I
made a similar argument in (unsuccessfully) urging the Advisory Committee either to remove

Rule 32.1 from its study agenda or to postpone action on Rule 32.1 to give the matter further
study. Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 93-94 (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Schiltz
Memorandum], availableat http://www.nonpublication.com/schiltz.pdf.
127. Spring 2004 Minutes, supra note 118, at 8.

128.

Id.
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difficult to conduct and would change few minds.1 29 The Advisory Committee
also discussed two possible ways to limit Rule 32.1: first, amending it to apply
only to unpublished opinions issued after the rule takes effect, 130 and, second,
rewriting it to permit circuits to bar the citation of unpublished opinions unless
there is no published opinion on point (similar to the Solicitor General's
original proposal). 131 The Advisory Committee dropped both proposals after it
became clear that the proposals did not have much support.' 32 The Advisory
Committee voted six to one to approve Rule 32.1,133 with only one stylistic
change. 134
Rule 32.1 again went before the Standing Committee in June 2004.
Because this time the Standing Committee's decision was not whether to
publish the rule, but whether to approve it, the Standing Committee discussed
the merits of the rule at length. 35 It was clear that members of the Standing
Committee had reviewed the comments carefully, and many mentioned that
they had been lobbied by judges and others. No member of the Standing
Committee defended no-citation rules on the merits; everyone who spoke about
136
no-citation rules personally opposed them. And no member-save one said that he or she opposed Rule 32.1 on the merits. But the Standing
Committee nevertheless decided, by unanimous voice vote, to return the
proposed rule to the Advisory Committee for further study. 137 The Standing
Committee was clear that its decision did not reflect a lack of support for Rule
32.1.138 Rather, the Standing Committee's decision reflected concern about the
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 9-10.
131. Id. at 10-11.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 9. A member who was unavoidably absent later informed the Advisory
Committee that he would have voted against the proposed rule. Id.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Minutes of Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 8-11 (June 1718, 2004) [hereinafter June 2004 Minutes], availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
june2004.pdf.
136. See id.at 9-10 (citing one member's contention that potential adverse consequences
of Rule 32.1 "might well come to pass").
137. Id. at 1l.
138. Id. The June 2004 Minutes stated:
One member asked that the record reflect that the committee's discussion of the
matter and its returning the rule to the advisory committee did not reflect a
judgment by the Standing Committee on the merits of the proposal. Rather, he
said, the committee's concerns were directed purely to ins[ti]tutional values and the
rulemaking process. [The Standing Committee] agreed to the clarification.
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strong opposition to the rule expressed by many commentators, especially
federal judges. Standing Committee members noted that some of those
commentators' claims--such as the claim that liberalizing no-citation rules
would result in longer disposition times-could be tested empirically. Before
voting on Rule 32.1, members wanted to make certain that they had taken every
39
reasonable step to gather information relevant to the arguments ofboth sides.'
In the weeks that followed, the FJC and the AO worked with Judge David
F. Levi (the Chair of the Standing Committee), Judge Alito, and others to
design a study. Eventually, they agreed on a three-part approach. The first part
involved sending a survey to all circuit judges (active and senior) and to a
randomly selected sample of appellate lawyers, asking about such topics as the
impact of liberalizing a citation rule on the workloads ofjudges and attorneys.
The second part involved a close study of a sample of cases from each circuit to
identify, among other things, how often unpublished opinions were cited in the
circuits with liberal citation rules. The third part involved a review of data
collected by the AO to determine whether liberalizing or abolishing no-citation
rules seemed to cause either an increase in case disposition times or an increase
in the percentage of cases disposed of by one-line judgment orders.
Most of this research was complete in time for the April 2005 meeting of
the Advisory Committee. A detailed review of the findings is beyond the scope
of this Article,'"0 but I will briefly summarize the Committee's findings. The
AO identified, with respect to the nine circuits that do not forbid the citation of
unpublished opinions, the year that each circuit liberalized or abolished its nocitation rule. 141The AO examined data for that base year, as well as for the two
years preceding and (where possible) the two years following that base year.142
The AO focused on median case disposition times 143 and on the number of
cases disposed of by one-line judgment orders (referred to by the AO as
"summary dispositions"). The AO reported that "[t]he data show[] little or no
evidence that the adoption of a permissive citation policy impacts the median

139. See id.at 10 ("Judge Levi added that it would not be advisable to seek Judicial
Conference approval of the proposed new rule at this time without supporting empirical data.
Obtaining the data would better inform the committee and take much of the passion out of the
debate.").
140. I have reviewed the studies in more detail in Schiltz, supranote 119.
141. Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, Chief, Rules Committee Support Office,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 1(Feb. 24,
2005) [hereinafter Rabiej Memorandum] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. Id.
143. Id. The AO looked at both the time from submission of the briefs to final judgment
and the time from oral argument to final judgment. Id.
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disposition time in either direction"''44 and "little or no evidence that the
adoption of a permissive citation policy impacts the number of summary
dispositions. 1 45 The data simply failed to support two of the key arguments
made by opponents of Rule 32.1: that allowing citation of unpublished
opinions will result in judges spending much more time drafting unpublished
opinions and in courts disposing of many more cases with one-line orders.
The FJC's survey of judges was equally unhelpful to opponents of Rule
32.1. A large majority of the judges in the nine circuits that permit at least
some citation of unpublished opinions rejected the most important premises of
the arguments against Rule 32.1. For example, by substantial margins, the
judges on those circuits said that permitting the citation of unpublished
opinions creates little additional work for judges 46 and that approval of Rule
to spend more time preparing
not result in judges having
32.1 would opinions.
147 The judges on the four circuits that bar the citation of
unpublished
unpublished opinions did agree with the major arguments of Rule 32.1's
opponents, but their views were more mixed than might have been anticipated.
For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a majority ofjudges---eight of thirteenpredicted that the time devoted to unpublished opinions would either stay the
same or decrease if Rule 32.1 were approved.148 Likewise, half of the judges in
the Federal Circuit-seven of fourteen-predicted that the time devoted to
unpublished opinions would not increase.149 The Second Circuit was split
almost in thirds: seven judges predicted no impact or a decrease, six judges
predicted a "very small," "small," or "moderate" increase, and six judges
predicted a "great" or "very great" increase.1 50 Even in the Ninth Circuit,
seventeen of forty-three judges predicted no impact or a decrease-almost as
many as the twenty who predicted a "great" or "very great" increase.' 51
The most interesting part of the FJC's survey was the set of questions
directed only to the judges of the First and D.C. Circuits. Both courts recently
had liberalized their citation rules. 52 The FJC asked the judges of the First and
144. Id.
145. Id.at 2.
146. See REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10, 38 tbl.J (finding that 85 out of 116 judges
surveyed answered that a brief citing an unpublished opinion created either a "small" or a "very
small" amount of additional work for them).
147. Id. at 8-9, 36 tbl.H.
148. Id.at 36 tbl.H.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.at 11 (noting that the First Circuit changed from barring the citation of
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D.C. Circuits what impact their rule changes had on the time they devote to
preparing unpublished opinions and on their overall workload. 153 Opponents
of Rule 32.1 have consistently claimed that if citing unpublished opinions
becomes easier, judges will have to spend much more time drafting them, and
that, in general, the workload of judges will increase. The responses of the
judges in the First and D.C. Circuits did not support those claims. All of the
judges-save one-said that the time they devote to preparing unpublished
opinions had "remained unchanged. "4 And all of the judges-save onesaid that liberalizing their rule had caused "no appreciable change" in the
difficulty of their work. 155
The FJC's survey of attorneys gave no more comfort to opponents of
Rule 32.1 than did the FJC's survey of judges. Attorneys said that they
already research unpublished opinions-even in the circuits in which they
cannot cite them-and that they frequently run across unpublished opinions
that they would like to cite. 156 Directly contradicting the predictions of
opponents of Rule 32.1, a substantial majority of attorneys predicted that
approval of Rule 32.1 would reduce or have "no appreciable impact" on their
workloads. 57 And in every circuit save one, the number of attorneys who
predicted that Rule 32.1 would have a positive impact outnumbered the
number of attorneys who predicted that Rule 32.1 would have a negative
impact. 58 The ratio of attorneys predicting a positive effect to those
predicting a negative effect was almost always at least two-to-one, often at
least three-to-one, and, in a few circuits, over four-to-one. 59 Only in the
Ninth Circuit-the epicenter of opposition to Rule 32.1-did opponents
outnumber supporters, and that was by a margin of only 50% to 38%. 160

unpublished opinions to permitting it in limited circumstances while the D.C. Circuit changed
from barring the citation of unpublished opinions to freely permitting it with respect to
unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1,2002); see also 1ST CIR. R. 32.3 (describing
circumstances in which unpublished opinions maybe cited); D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B) (removing
restrictions on citations to unpublished opinions).
153.

REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12-13.

154. Id. at 12-13, 42 tbl.N.
155. Id. at 12-13, 43 tbl.O.
156. Id. at 15-16, 45-48 tbls.Q-T. Opponents of Rule 32.1 insist that there is nothing of
value in unpublished opinions and that one benefit of a no-citation rule is that it saves attorneys
the trouble of researching useless opinions.
157. Id. at 17, 49 tbl.U.
158. Id. at 50 tbl.V.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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When the Advisory Committee met in April 2005 to review the results
of the AO's and FJC's studies, the rout was on. All members of the Advisory
Committee-both the supporters and the opponents of Rule 32.1-agreed
that the studies failed to support the main arguments against Rule 32.1.161
Some Advisory Committee members-including one of the two opponents of
Rule 32.1-went further and contended that the studies in some respects
actually refuted those arguments.' 62 The bottom line was that, in the wake of
the studies, not a single member of the Advisory Committee believed that the
no-citation rules of the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits should
be left in place. Seven Advisory Committee members continued to support
Rule 32.1 163 But even the two Advisory Committee members who had
opposed Rule 32.1 announced that, in light of the studies, they were prepared
to support a national rule on citing unpublished opinions. 164 Those two
members still did not support Rule 32.1; they preferred a rule that would
permit the citation of unpublished opinions only in certain circumstances,
such as when no published precedent would serve as well. 165 But they no
longer opposed any national rulemaking on the issue of unpublished
opinions. After amending Rule 32.1 to clarify that it applied only to the
unpublished opinions of federal courts,
166 the Advisory Committee approved
67
Rule 32.1 by vote of seven to two.'
The Standing Committee took up Rule 32.1 at its June 2005 meeting.
Those members who had previously supported the rule continued to support
it, and those members who had previously expressed misgivings about the
rule were persuaded by the AO's and FJC's studies. The Standing

161. Draft Minutes of Spring 2005 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 12
(Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Spring 2005 Draft Minutes]. As of this writing, the draft minutes
of the April 2005 meeting have not been approved by the Advisory Committee.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 13-15.
165. Id.
166. At its June 2004 meeting, the Standing Committee had asked the Advisory Committee
to give thought to concerns that had been expressed by some state court judges that Rule 32.1
would have an impact on the development of state law. June 2004 Minutes, supra note 135, at
9, 11. I think it fair to say that most members of the Advisory Committee did not regard these
concerns as well founded, but, at the same time, thought that exempting the unpublished
opinions of state courts from the scope of Rule 32.1 was a costless way of reassuring state
judges. Spring 2005 Draft Minutes, supra note 16 1, at 17. (The change was deemed "costless"
because most federal appellate courts do not now bar the citation of state unpublished opinions,
and federal appellate courts are unlikely to do so in the future.)
167. Spring 2005 Draft Minutes, supra note 161, at 17.
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Committee approved Rule 32.1 unanimously. 68 In September 2005, the
Judicial Conference approved Rule 32.1 on a divided vote after amending the
rule so that it will apply only to unpublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2007. Rule 32.1 now moves to the Supreme Court and, if
approved there, to Congress.
III. Explaining the Controversy
As Part II makes clear, the unpublished-opinions issue has been the
subject of prolonged and, at times, even bitter controversy. The purpose of
this Part is to attempt to explain why-in particular, to attempt to explain the
disconnect between the relatively high level of controversy over this issue
and what I regard as the issue's relatively low level of importance.
Some dispute that this disconnect even exists. One argument I have
heard is that, notwithstanding what I have recounted above, the citation of
unpublished opinions is not, in fact, a terribly controversial issue. A second
argument I have heard is that, though there is a lot of controversy over the
citation of unpublished opinions, that controversy is not disproportionate but
merely reflects the fact that the issue is important. Both of these arguments
are wrong.
As to the first argument, some judges and lawyers contend that the
citation of unpublished opinions is not as controversial as it might seem.
These people attribute the near-record number of public comments submitted
regarding Rule 32.1 to the fact that one prominent judge-the Ninth Circuit's
Judge Kozinski--decided to mount a campaign against the proposed rule.
Judge Kozinski is one of the smartest, most aggressive, and best-connected
judges in America, the argument goes, and he and some of his colleagues on
the Ninth Circuit have tirelessly lobbied against Rule 32.1. They have, it is
said, lobbied their colleagues on the Ninth and other circuits, the lower-court
judges whose decisions they review, the lawyers who appear before them, the
former clerks who worked for them, members of the Advisory and Standing
168. Key Judicial Panel Approves Rule Change Allowing Citation of Unpublished
Opinions, 73 U.S.L.W. 2761, 2761 (June 21, 2005). The text of the rule approved by the
Standing Committee is quoted above in note 8. The Committee Note approved by the Standing
Committee differed significantly from the Committee Note that was published for comment in
August 2003, PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supranote 8, at 32-39, and from the Committee Note that
was approved by the Advisory Committee in April 2005, Alito Memorandum 2005, supra note
8, at 2-7. Both of those versions were several pages long and addressed at length the arguments
for and against the rule. The version approved by the Standing Committee included just five
brief paragraphs of explanation and not a word of argument.
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Committees, and others to oppose Rule 32.1. It was this aggressive lobbying,
and not widespread opposition to Rule 32.1, that supposedly produced so
many comments against the proposed rule. Those who make this argument
cite the fact that the vast majority of comments opposing Rule 32.1 came
from judges and lawyers with Ninth Circuit ties,169 as well as other evidence
that Judge Kozinski helped to lead a campaign against the rule. 70
This argument is meritless. To begin with, as Part II makes clear, the
controversy over the citation of unpublished opinions did not begin with Rule
32.1. Recall that in 1990 the Judicial Conference (in response to a
recommendation from the FCSC) refused even to study the issue of
unpublished opinions 1 1 because opposition to rulemaking on the issue was so
strong. Recall also that the survey of the chiefjudges undertaken in 1998 by
Judge Garwood revealed such passionate opposition to rulemaking on the
issue of unpublished opinions that the Advisory Committee dropped the topic
from its study agenda. 172 Other examples exist, but the point is clear:
Opposition to rulemaking on the issue of unpublished opinions was
widespread and deeply felt long before there was a proposed Rule 32.1.
When Rule 32.1 was published for comment in 2003, many
federal judges-including almost every judge on 174 the Ninth
Seventh, 175
Circuit, 173 as well as most of the judges on the Second,
169. See Alito Memorandum 2004, supra note 110, at 2 (noting that about 80% of the
comments opposing Rule 32.1 came from those with Ninth Circuit connections).
170. Some of that evidence is mentioned in Barnett, Dog That DidNot Bark, supranote
11, at 1499.
171. SEPTEMBER 1990 REPORT, supra note 27, at 88.
172. Spring 1998 Minutes, supranote 43, at pt. V.C.
173. Thirty-eight of the active and senior judges of the Ninth Circuit individually submitted
comments opposing Rule 32.1. Alito Memorandum 2005, supranote 8, at 94-96. One active
judge of the Ninth Circuit-a former member of the Standing Committee-submitted a
comment supporting Rule 32.1. A. Wallace Tashima, Public Comment 03-AP-288, Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.secretjustic.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-288.pdf.
174. Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr. submitted a comment opposing Rule 32.1 on behalf
of himself and eighteen active and senior judges on the Second Circuit. John M. Walker, Jr.,
Public Comment 03-AP-329, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 11,
2004) [hereinafter Walker Comment], available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/
Comments/03-AP-329.pdf.
175. Nine active judges of the Seventh Circuit jointly submitted a comment opposing Rule
32.1. John L. Coffey et al., Public Comment 03-AP-396, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Coffey Comment], available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-396.pdf. Two active judges of the
Seventh Circuit individually submitted comments supporting Rule 32.1. Frank H. Easterbrook,
Public Comment 03-AP-367, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 13,
2004) [hereinafter Easterbrook Comment], availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/
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Eighth, 176 and Federal Circuits 177-submitted comments opposing it. I have
worked closely with federal judges for much of my professional life, and I can
attest that they are among the world's least "lobby-able" people. I have no
doubt that the reason why many judges opposed rulemaking on unpublished
opinions in 2003 was the same reason why many opposed such rulemaking in
1998 and 1990-not because Judge Kozinski or anyone else twisted their arms,
but because they sincerely believed that rulemaking on unpublished
opinions
178
was, as Chief Judge Edwards had put it, "a terrible idea."'
Much the same can be said for the lawyers who opposed Rule 32.1. It is
true that most of those lawyers were affiliated with the Ninth Circuit, 179 and it is
clear that there was an organized effort in the Ninth Circuit to encourage
lawyers to submit comments opposing Rule 32.1.180 But that hardly proves
Comments/03-AP-367.pdf.; Kenneth F. Ripple, Public Comment 03-AP-335, Proposed Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/
pdf files/Comments/03-AP-335.pdf. Interestingly, Judge Easterbrook is a former member of
the Standing Committee, and Judge Ripple is a former chair of the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules.
176. Chief Judge James B. Loken submitted a comment reporting that seven of the nine
active judges of the Eighth Circuit who expressed a view on Rule 32.1-as well as three of the
four senior judges who expressed a view-opposed adoption of the rule. James B. Loken,
Public Comment 03-AP-499, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 23,
2004) [hereinafter Loken Comment], available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/
Comments/03-AP-499.pdf.
177. Chief Judge Haldane Robert Mayer submitted a comment opposing Rule 32.1 on
behalf of himself and all other active and seniorjudges of the Federal Circuit. Haldane Robert
Mayer, Public Comment 03-AP-086, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Jan.
6, 2004) [hereinafter Mayer Comment], available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/
Comments/03-AP-086.pdf. Four Federal Circuit judges also wrote individually to express their
opposition. Timothy B. Dyk, Public Comment 03-AP-397, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf
files/Comments/03-AP-397.pdf; Daniel M. Friedman, Public Comment 03-AP-506, Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-506.pdf; Paul R. Michel, Public
Comment 03-AP-505, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-505.pdf; S. Jay Plager,
Public Comment 03-AP-297, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 2,
2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP-297.pdf.
178. Edwards Letter, supra note 44, at 2.
179. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supra note 8, at 101-21 (listing attorneys). For
example, sixty-two of the sixty-nine federal public defenders who submitted comments
opposing Rule 32.1 worked in the Ninth Circuit. Id.at 101-05. Professor Barnett's research
suggests that the views of those public defenders are not widely shared by public defenders who
do not work in the Ninth Circuit. See Barnett, Dog That DidNotBark, supranote 11, at 151334 (summarizing the results of thirty-six interviews with public defenders who work in the nine
circuits which allow citation to unpublished opinions).
180. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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that the Ninth Circuit lawyers who opposed Rule 32.1 did so only because
a Ninth Circuit judge or someone else asked them to do so. 18 1 After all, the
Ninth Circuit is the largest circuit; its workload is staggering, and it makes
particularly heavy use of unpublished opinions. Moreover, most lawyers
who practice in the Ninth Circuit also practice in the California state
courts, which have been roiled for years by controversy over unpublished
opinions. 182 It is not at all surprising that most of the comments about Rule
32.1-negative and positive--came from the Ninth Circuit.
And that points to another problem with attributing the controversy
over Rule 32.1 to Judge Kozinski. It is not only those who agree with
Judge Kozinski who are passionate about unpublished opinions.
Supporters of citation feel just as strongly. Over the past few years,
organizations such as the American Bar Association,18 3 the American
181. Fifly percent of Ninth Circuit attorneys responding to the FJC's survey predicted that
Rule 32.1 would have a negative effect, while 38% predicted that it would have a positive
effect. REAGAN ET AL., supranote 1, at 50 tbl.V. Only in the Ninth Circuit did the "opponents"
of Rule 32.1 outnumber the "supporters"; in the other circuits, "supporters" outnumbered
"opponents" by margins that sometimes exceeded four-to-one. Id. The views expressed by
Ninth Circuit attorneys who responded to the FJC's survey cannot be dismissed as the result of
an organized campaign, as those surveyed were selected by the FJC at random. The views of
Ninth Circuit attorneys are unquestionably out of step with the views of other attorneys, but
there is no reason to suggest that those views are insincere.
182. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, PublishingAll Opinions Will Improve JudicialSystem
in State, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 10, 2004, at 6 (responding to William Rylaarsdam's article of
March 3, 2004, which criticized moves to liberalize no-citation rules), available at
http://nonpublication.com/barnett3-10.pdf, William Rylaarsdam, Lawmakers Must Resist
Movement to Cite Unpublished Opinions, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 3, 2004, at 6 (stating that recent
attempts "to remove the distinction between published and unpublished opinions are illfounded"), availableat http://nonpublication.com/rylaarsdam.pdf; Ronald M. George, Public
Comment 03-AP-47 1, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 1-5 (Feb. 13,
2004) (describing why the California Supreme Court has declined to permit citation to
unpublished opinions), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP47 l.pdf; Gary E. Strankman, Public Comment 03-AP-296, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, app. at 2-7 (Feb. 5, 2004) (discussing a California proposal to allow citation of
unpublished opinions and why an appellate task force rejected it), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-296.pdf.
183. See Hearing Transcript, supranote 111, at 85-95 (quoting Judah Best's testimony on
behalf of the American Bar Association opposing no-citation rules); see also Report of the
Section ofLitigation, 126 No. 2 REP. A.B.A. 897, 897 (2001). The recommendation states:
[The American Bar Association opposes the practice of various federal courts of
appeal[s] in prohibiting citation to or reliance upon their unpublished opinions as
contrary to the best interests of the public and the legal profession.
... [T]he American Bar Association urges the federal courts of appeals
uniformly to... [p]ermit citation to relevant unpublished opinions.
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College of Trial Lawyers,' 84 and the American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers 85 have opposed no-citation rules. Likewise, many federal and state
rules. 86
lawmakers have been persuaded to abolish or liberalize no-citation
Presumably, Judge Kozinski was not behind these efforts. One commentator
on Rule 32.1 said that, when he served as chair of the D.C. Circuit's Advisory
Committee on Procedures, the circuit's rule barring citation was "perennially
and uniformly condemned."' 187 Presumably it was not Judge Kozinski doing
this condemning. I know very little about what lobbying Judge Kozinski or his
colleagues might have done, but I do know that the controversy over Rule 32.1
is real and cannot be dismissed as their creation.
The second argument that I have heard is in some respects the opposite of
the first. Some agree that there is indeed a great deal of controversy over the
issue of citing unpublished opinions, but contend that the level of controversy
simply reflects the level of importance of the issue. Many of those opposing
Rule 32.1 made dire predictions about the harm that the rule will inflict on
judges, lawyers, and litigants if it is approved. 188 Assuming (as I do) that these
commentators were sincere, asking them why there is so much controversy over
Rule 32.1 would be like asking them why there is so much controversy over
abortion or the death penalty. The reason for the controversy would seem selfevident to them.

184. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 111, at 209-29 (quoting William T. Hangley's
testimony on behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers); see also William T. Hangley,
Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: A Report and Recommendations of the American
College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication and Citation ofNonbinding Federal Circuit Court
Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 647 (2002) (arguing that there should be no restrictions on the
citation of unpublished opinions).
185. See Letter from Kenneth C. Bass, III, President, American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Nov. 11,
2002) (attaching a position paper adopted by the Board of Directors opposing no-citation rules)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
186. See Barnett, Under Siege, supra note 11, at 474-85 (discussing recent changes in the
federal circuits and state court systems); Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal
and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESs 349, 349 (2004) ("The First Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit, Alaska,
Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia have all [recently]
modified their rules in some way to allow citation of unpublished opinions either as persuasive
authority or in some cases as precedent.").
187. Philip Allen Lacovara, Public Comment 03-AP-016, Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 3 (Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/
pdf files/Comments/03-AP-016.pdf.
188. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supra note 8, at 53-73 (describing arguments against
the adoption of the proposed rule).
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The problem with this view is that Rule 32.1 is not, in fact, an important
rule. I recognize, of course, that this point is hotly contested by those who feel
deeply about Rule 32.1, some of whom are my friends, and some of whom I
consider to be among the best judges and lawyers in the nation. But, with
respect, I think they are wrong.
Let me be clear about two things. First, in saying that Rule 32.1 is not an
important rule, I am focusing on the one and only issue addressed by Rule 32.1:
the citation of unpublished opinions. As described below, 9I 1 certainly agree
that there are closely related issues-such as whether unpublished opinions
should or must be treated as precedential-that are extremely important.
Second, in assessing the importance of Rule 32.1, I am considering only its
practicaleffect. What impact will it have on judges? Will it substantially
affect their workload? What about attorneys? Will it make their jobs more or
less difficult? And what about parties? Will it enable them to win cases that
they would otherwise lose (or cause them to lose cases that they would
otherwise win)?
The vast majority of those who submitted comments about Rule 32.1 had
no actual experience with the citation of unpublished opinions because they
came from one of the four circuits that prohibit it.' 9 Their comments, not
surprisingly, were grounded largely on speculation about the likely impact of
Rule 32.1. But speculation is not necessary. Numerous federal and state
jurisdictions have liberalized or abolished their no-citation rules over the past
decade or two, and, as the work of the FJC and AO confirm, there is no
evidence that it has made much difference, one way or another. Judges and
lawyers in jurisdictions that allow the citation of unpublished opinions appear
to function essentially the same as judges and lawyers in jurisdictions that bar
the citation of unpublished opinions.
It is telling that, out of the 504 comments submitted on Rule 32.1, not one
(to the best of my memory 91) cited a problem experienced by a state or federal
jurisdiction that has permitted the citation of unpublished opinions. 192 It is
189. Infra Part III.A.
190. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supra note 8, at 93-127 (listing commentators).
191. I read every word of every one of the comments in the spring of 2004, but I have not
re-read the comments in writing this Article. I am confident, though, that if ajudge or attorney
had described a problem experienced by a circuit that permitted the citation of unpublished
opinions, I would remember it, and I would have mentioned it in my memorandum to the
Advisory Committee. See Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 126 (summarizing the 484
comments submitted prior to the February 16, 2004 deadline).
192. To the contrary, Eighth Circuit Senior Judge Myron H. Bright, who testified against
Rule 32.1 at the April 13, 2004 hearing, candidly admitted that, in his experience as a visiting
judge in several of the federal circuits, he had not noticed any difference between the circuits
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equally telling that no such problem was cited by any of the judges or attorneys
who responded to the FJC's survey, 193 nor did any of the public defenders
surveyed by Professor Stephen R. Barnett cite any such problem.' 94 Predictions
of doom came not from those who have experience with permitting the citation
of unpublished opinions, but from the four circuits that continue to forbid it.' 95
At the same time, there seems to be little evidence in the FJC study or any
other source that liberal citation rules produce much in the way of practical
benefits. (And, again, in assessing the importance of Rule 32.1, I am focusing
solely on the practical.) The judges on the nine circuits that permit the citation
of unpublished opinions, while of the view that such citation does not cause
them much work, were also of the view that such citation does not give them
much help.1 96 Only seven of 123 judges said that citations to unpublished
with liberal citation policies and the circuits that ban citation:
JUDGE ALITO: Let me ask you a question.., that draws on your unique
experience of having sat with so many different circuits. I don't think any of our
other witnesses has had that experience. You've sat with circuits that prohibit the
citation of unpublished opinions, circuits that have no prohibition, circuits that
limit the citation to certain circumstances, I guess including your own circuit. I
wondered if you have noticed any effect that these local rules have had on either the
work of the lawyers or the work of the judges....
JUDGE BRIGHT: I have to say in all honesty there really doesn't seem to be any
difference. I've sat on the Third Circuit [which does not prohibit the citation of
unpublished opinions]. There may have been some unpublished opinions that have
been cited. I can't remember them and I didn't pay any attention to them ifI could.
And the same goes in every one of the circuits--even the Eighth Circuit, the
same....

Hearing Transcript, supranote 111, at 19-21.
193. See REAGAN ET AL., supranote 1, at 3-10, 17-19 (reporting predicted problems, but
not discussing any problems currently plaguing "permissive" circuits).
194. See generally Barnett,Dog That DidNot Bark,supranote 11, at 1496,1505 (pointing
out the lack of complaints from lawyers and judges who work in circuits which allow citation to
unpublished opinions).
195. In their responses to the FJC survey, the judges in the four circuits that have no
experience permitting the citation of unpublished opinions were consistently more pessimistic
about Rule 32.1 than the judges in the nine circuits that have such experience. For example, the
FJC asked the judges in the four circuits that ban citation and in the six circuits that permit
citation in limited circumstances whether approval ofRule 32.1 would result in judges having to
spend more time preparing unpublished opinions-a key claim of those who oppose Rule 32.1.
REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. A majority of the judges in the six circuits that have some
experience permitting citation said that judges would not, in fact, have to spend more time
preparing unpublished opinions, and, among the minority of judges who disagreed, most
predicted only a "very small," "small," or "moderate" increase. Id. at 8-9, 36 tbl.H. By contrast,
a majority of the judges in the four circuits that do not have experience permitting citation
predicted that the time devoted to preparing unpublished opinions would increase, and many
predicted a "great" or "very great" increase. Id.
196. Id. at 10, 38 tbl.J.
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opinions are "often" or "very often" helpful; a majority said that such citations
were "never" or "seldom" helpful. 197 And only three of 122 judges said that the
unpublished opinions that are cited are "often" or "very often" inconsistent with
the circuit's published opinions; by contrast, an overwhelming majority (eightysix judges) said that unpublished opinions "never" or "seldom" say something
different from the published precedent. 198 In sum, almost all available
evidence-both the dogs that are barking and the dogs that are not-seems to
point to the same conclusion: The approval or rejection of Rule 32.1 will have
little practical impact on judges, lawyers, or parties.
I want to stress that this is not an argument for or against Rule 32.1. I
have been careful to note that citation rules do not seem to make a lot of
difference, one way or another. Those who start from the premise that courts
should generally be free to operate as they see fit could cite this as a reason to
reject Rule 32.1 (because the rule would do little practical good). Those who
start from the premise that courts should generally not be free to forbid litigants
to cite the court's own official public actions could cite this as a reason to
approve Rule 32.1 (because the rule would cause little practical harm). The
point is simply that it is difficult to regard Rule 32.1 as important when it will
almost surely have little real-world impact.
Thus, we are back to our disconnect. If I am right on both counts-both in
my assertion that the issue is very controversial and in my assertion that the
issue is not very important-then how do I explain this anomaly? Let me start
with the supporters of Rule 32.1-those who feel passionately that the citation
of unpublished opinions should be permitted.
A. Supporters of Rule 32.1
Over the years, the opposition to no-citation rules has been driven mostly,
although not entirely, by practitioners, while the support for no-citation rules
has been driven mostly, although not entirely, by judges. 199 Thus, I will focus
197. Id. at 10, 39 tbl.K.
198. Id. at 11, 40 tbl.L.
199. Interestingly, law professors have overwhelmingly opposed no-citation rules in their
published scholarship, but the law professors who submitted comments on Rule 32.1
overwhelmingly supported such rules. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supranote 8, at 99-100
(listing professors). This may relate to the fact that the law professors who submitted comments
on Rule 32.1 were mostly former Ninth Circuit clerks who have not previously demonstrated a
scholarly interest in the issue of unpublished opinions. See supra note 115 (stating that
seventeen of twenty-one law professors opposing the proposed rule were former Ninth Circuit
clerks).
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on the reasons why some practitioners so intensely dislike no-citation rules and
why some judges so intensely support them. Understand, though, that neither
practitioners nor judges are of one mind on this issue. Many practitioners
submitted comments against Rule 32.1,20 0 while many judges have either
supported Rule 32.1201 or already voted to abolish or liberalize no-citation rules.
The practitioners who agitate in favor of citing unpublished opinions seem
to be motivated primarily by principle, whereas the judges who agitate against
citing unpublished opinions seem to be motivated primarily by practical
concerns. I do not want to overstate the point. Opponents of citation certainly
cite principle, and proponents certainly cite practical concerns. For example,
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.1 claimed that "Rule 32.1 (a) will
further the administration of justice by expanding the sources of insight and
information that can be brought to the attention of judges. ' '20 2 Supporters of
20 3
Rule 32.1 have pointed to examples such as UnitedStates v. Rivera-Sanchez,
in which the Ninth Circuit described how twenty inconsistent unpublished
opinions on the same question of law had been issued by various panels before
the Ninth Circuit finally settled the question in a published opinion. 20 4 In such
cases, Rule 32.1 's supporters say, a court has needlessly reinvented the wheel
time and again-and treated similarly situated litigants differently-all because
the court has stubbornly refused to permit litigants to inform the court of its
own past decisions.
The argument that Rule 32.1 will provide some practical benefits has
always struck me as less than compelling. As noted above, the judges in the
nine circuits that allow the citation of unpublished opinions overwhelmingly
say that it is not often helpful and that it does not often bring to their attention
unpublished opinions that are inconsistent with published precedent. 20 5 Even
the anecdotal evidence that allowing the citation of unpublished opinions will
improve judicial decision-making is sparse. I have pressed attorneys to identify
for me cases in which all of the following were true: (1) the attorney had an
200. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supra note 8, at 101-21 (listing attorneys who
submitted comments opposing Rule 32.1).
201. See id.at 123 (listing judges who submitted comments supporting Rule 32.1); see also
Hearing Transcript, supra note 111, at 234-54 (quoting the testimony of Judge Edward R.
Becker in favor of Rule 32.1). The three federal appellate judges now on the Advisory
Committee-Judge Alito of the Third Circuit, Judge Carl E. Stewart of the Fifth Circuit, and
Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., then of the D.C. Circuit-have all supported Rule 32.1. Spring
2004 Minutes, supra note 118, at 8.
202. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supranote 8, at 38.
203. United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
204. Id. at 1062-63.
205. Supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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unpublished opinion that he or she wanted to cite; (2) the citation of that
unpublished opinion was barred; (3) the court likely did not learn of that
unpublished opinion in any other way, such as through a party moving for
permission to cite the unpublished opinion 20 6 or through the court's own
research; and (4) had the court learned of that unpublished opinion, the court
likely would have decided the case differently. Every lawyer to whom I have
posed this question has been able to identify, at most, only a case or two in
which being able to cite an unpublished opinion likely would have made a
difference to the outcome. Lawyers are understandably angry about those
cases, but that does not change the fact that those cases are rare. There is little
evidence (even anecdotal) that barring the citation of unpublished opinions
causes substantial practical harm-in particular, that it causes courts to rule
differently than they would if unpublished opinions were cited.
Why, then, do lawyers and others so passionately oppose no-citation rules?
I think it is because for them this is a matter of principle. The citation of
unpublished opinions is not an important issue, when importance is measured
by the presence or absence of practical impact. But the issue sits at the
intersection of a surprising number of principles that are very important. Those
principles include the following:
First, freedom of speech. Americans are generally free to say what they
want, when they want, to whom they want. It is rare that the government tries
to forbid its citizens from saying something. Lawyers who support Rule 32.1
have told me that no-citation rules feel like gag orders,2 °7 and no one likes
being subject to a gag order.20 8 Some have gone even further and argued that
no-citation rules violate the First Amendment. 2°
206. This, of course, is an easy way to circumvent a no-citation rule because, even if the
motion is denied, a judge or a law clerk is likely to read the opinion that the motion asks
permission to cite.
207. See Goering,supra note 11, at 89 ("[No-citation rules] effectively impose a gag order
on the federal bar."); see also Hearing Transcript, supranote 111, at 224 (quoting the testimony
of William T. Hangley on behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers) (describing nocitation rules as "gagging lawyers and their clients").
208. Not only attorneys have made this point. Judge Richard S. Arnold described the
effect of no-citation rules as follows: "Even more striking, if we decided a case directly on point
yesterday, lawyers may not even remind us of this fact. The bar is gagged." Richard S. Arnold,
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 221 (1999).
209. E.g., Richard S. Arnold, The FederalCourts: Causes ofDiscontent,56 SMU L. REv.
767, 778 (2003); Charles L. Babcock, No-CitationRules: An UnconstitutionalPriorRestraint,
LIG., Summer 2004, at 33; David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., The Censorial
Judiciary,35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1133, 1161-66 (2002); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes,
Constitutionalityof "No-Citation"Rules, 3 J. Ap. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 297-300 (2001);
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the FirstAmendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705,
780-83 (2004); Maria Brooke Tusk, Note, No-CitationRules as a PriorRestrainton Attorney
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Second, accountability. If Americans are generally free to say what they
want, that is especially true when what they want to say relates to the official
public actions of the government. If one were to ask the typical citizen, typical
lawyer, or even typical judge, "Does the federal government have the power to
forbid its citizens from talking to the federal government about the federal
government?," the answer would almost surely be, "Of course not." And yet
that is exactly what no-citation rules do. It is difficult to identify officials of the
federal government--other than appellate judges-who are permitted to say to
a citizen: "I forbid you, on pain of sanction that I will impose, to even mention
to me a public action that I took in my official capacity. 2 10 In judging, as in
other walks of life, "the absence
of accountability and responsibility... breeds
2 11
sloth and indifference.,
Third, transparency. For centuries, the Anglo-American justice system has
done its work in the full light of day-a tradition with roots in revulsion at the
secret proceedings of the Star Chamber. Federal judges exercise tremendous
power and, alone among federal officials, enjoy life tenure. It is hardly
surprising, then, that Americans feel strongly that such officials should be
required to exercise such power in the open. No-citation rules smack of secrecy
and give rise to suspicion-unwarranted, I believe, but also not surprisingthat judges are trying to get away with something, such as2 burying
"nuisance"
12
cases that raise difficult issues that judges prefer to duck.
Fourth, equal justice. A bedrock principle of our judicial system--and an
essential component of the rule of law-is that like cases should be treated
alike. It is unjust when Litigant A wins a case because Issue Xis decided one
way, and then Litigant B loses a case because Issue X is decided the opposite
way. One can understand such inconsistency when it is the result of
Speech, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1202, 1227-30 (2003).
210. For this reason, it is surprising that no-citation rules-"gag orders," in the eyes of
some attorneys and judges-are supported by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California.
See Peter Eliasberg, Public Comment 03-AP-235, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 (Jan. 28, 2004) (opposing the adoption of the proposed FRAP 32.1), available
at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP-235.pdf.
211. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 284 (1996)
[hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari].
212. As Judge Easterbrook put it:
Lawyers can cite everything from decisions of the Supreme Court to... op-ed
pieces in local newspapers; why should the 'unpublished' judicial orders be the
only matter off limits to citation and argument? It implies that judges have
something to hide. In some corners there is a perception that they do-that
unpublished orders are used to sweep under the rug departures from precedent.
Easterbrook Comment, supra note 175, at 1-2.
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inadvertence or mistake; judges are human, after all. One can also understand
such inconsistency when it is a product of different courts reaching different
conclusions about Issue X; disagreements between courts are unavoidable in
our system. And one can even understand such inconsistency when it is caused
by a court changing its mind-at least when the court is open about the fact and
takes the time to explain its reasoning. But when the same court, without
explanation or even acknowledgment, treats Litigant B differently from Litigant
A, and when Litigant B has been forbidden even to tell the court about Litigant
A's case, then Litigant B may well question the court's commitment to equal
justice. Making matters worse, the court does itself no favor when the reason it
gives for prohibiting Litigant B from telling it about Litigant A's case is that it
does not want to feel "a moral duty" to explain to Litigant B why it is treating
him or her different from Litigant A. 213
The principle of equal justice appears to be offended in another way.
Federal appellate judges are issuing two classes of opinions-a "first class" of
opinions that are carefully crafted, that are published, that can be cited, and that
are treated as binding, and a "second class" of opinions that are not as carefully
crafted, that are not published, that cannot be cited, and that are not treated as
binding. No one likes to receive second-class justice. And when first-class
opinions seem disproportionately to be issued in cases involving wealthy
21 4
litigants who are represented by prominent attorneys, anger over the disparity
will only grow.
Fifth, professional autonomy. Lawyers chafe at being told what they may
and may not argue on behalf of a client. In part this is because lawyers tend to
213. See Coffey Comment, supranote 175, at I ("[If unpublished opinions can be cited,]
[w]e will have a moral duty to explain, distinguish, reaffirm, overrule, etc. any unpublished
order brought to our attention by counsel.").
214. This argument has been made passionately by William M. Richman and William L.
Reynolds. See Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari,supra note 211, at 275 ("[The federal
courts of appeals have] created different tracks of justice for different cases and different
litigants: important cases (usually measured by monetary value) and powerful litigants receive
greater judicial attention than less important cases and weaker litigants."); id.at 277 ("Federal
appellate courts are treating litigants differently, a difference that generally turns on a litigant's
ability to mobilize substantial private legal assistance.... [T]hose without power receive less
(and different) justice."). Richmond and Reynolds further state:
A court is far less likely to hear oral argument or issue a published opinion in a
social security or civil rights case, a prisoner petition, or the like than it is to hear
argument or publish an opinion in an 'important' securities or antitrust case....
The cumulative effect of truncated procedures has a devastating impact on the
rights of those most in need of judicial protection, those litigants whose claims
raise no systematic law-making concerns, but only the claim that they have been
denied justice at the trial court.
Id. at 295.
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be independent, strong-willed people. But this is also because the bond
between lawyer and client is strong, and frequently lawyer and client feel that
they stand alone, not only against the client's adversary, but against the judicial
system and the rest of the world. For good reason, attorneys are generally free
to represent clients according to their best professional judgment. A court's
interference with that professional judgment will create resentment, especially
when that interference is not justified by compelling reasons.
Finally, the rule of law. Ours is supposed to be a nation of laws, not men
(or women). The judicial system will be accepted as legitimate only if
contemporary judicial decisions build incrementally and logically on the
judicial decisions of the past-only if the judges of today are in conversation
with the judges of yesterday. The notion that judges can pick and choose, ex
ante, which of their opinions will count as "law"-not just in the sense of being
"binding," but even in the sense of being "considered at least relevant, 215 when
the court confronts the same issue in the future-is viewed by many as
antithetical to the rule of law.
Please understand that I am not arguing here that no-citation rules do (or
do not) violate any of these principles. My task is to explain why people feel so
deeply about rules that seem to have so little practical consequence. The
answer is that most opponents of no-citation rules simply do not care about the
lack of practical consequences. Most opponents strongly believe in one or
more of these principles and strongly oppose no-citation rules because those
rules seem inconsistent with those principles.
Of course, none of these principles is absolute. All of them are commonly
compromised, in one sense or another. Even limitations on the size of briefs or
length of oral arguments could be seen as restricting the right to speak or to
represent one's client as one sees fit, and yet no one seems to get upset about
such limitations. The difference is that lawyers accept that courts could not
function without limiting the size of written submissions or the length of oral
arguments. After all, just about every court in the United States-federal and
state-has found it necessary to impose such limitations. But lawyers do not
accept that no-citation rules are similarly justified. After all, many courtsfederal and state--do fine without them.
One of the comments that I have heard most frequently from lawyers who
support Rule 32.1 is that it is almost impossible for a lawyer to explain to a
client why the lawyer cannot tell the court that the court has previously decided
a case identical to the client's. Clientsjust "don't get it," lawyers say. I do not
doubt that these lawyers are correct, and I suspect that the reason that their
215.

Price, supranote 69, at 108.
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clients "don't get it" is because no-citation rules are inconsistent with our civic
DNA-with principles that we Americans have internalized, such as the
principle that the government cannot, without compelling reason, forbid a
citizen from speaking to a government official about the actions of that
government official. At bottom, then, most of the emotion of the pro-citation
forces is driven by principle. They see no-citation rules as inconsistent with
important civic values and, although they may recognize the practical
consequences as being small, they see the justifications as being even smaller.
I believe that there are a couple of additional sources of anger toward nocitation rules. One is the frustration of attorneys-especially those who
regularly practice in more than one circuit-with the proliferation of local rules.
The local rules of the courts of appeals are numerous, lengthy, vague,
216 Every
conflicting, nitpicky, and often difficult to find, much less follow.
time an attorney seeks to file a brief in a circuit, that attorney must study dozens
of pages of local rules, practitioner guides, internal operating procedures,
standing orders, and the like-some of which are online and some of which are
not. 217 Thousands of hours of attorney time-and millions of dollars in client
funds-are wasted every year as lawyers try to navigate local rules in order to
practice in what is supposed to be a uniform national system. This problem
obviously extends far beyond rules regarding the citation of unpublished
opinions, but those rules are part of the problem. The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 32.1 cited as one advantage of the rule that "[a]ttomeys will no
longer have to pick through the conflicting no-citation rules of the circuits in
of unethical
which they practice, nor worry about being sanctioned or accused
218
opinion.,
'unpublished'
an
citing
conduct for improperly
This concern about the hardship imposed by conflicting local rules is often
dismissed by judges and was belittled by some opponents of Rule 32. 1.219 But
216. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization ofAppellate Justice: The Proliferationof
Local Rules In the FederalCircuits, 68 U. COLO.L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997) (describing the federal
judiciary's procedural incoherence).
217. See MARIE LEARY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANALYSIS OF BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2 (2004) (summarizing local rules of federal appellate
briefs and complaints about those local rules), available at http://www.fc.gov/
public/pdf nsf/lookup/BriefReq.pdf/$file/BriefReq.pdf.
218. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supranote 8, at 38. The Advisory Committee Note cited Hart v.
Massanari,266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), where a panel (that included Judge Kozinski)
ordered an attorney to show cause why he should not be disciplined for violating the Ninth
Circuit's no-citation rule, and ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
is ethically improper for a
Formal Opinion 94-386R (1995), where the ABA opined that "[i]t
lawyer to cite to a court an unpublished opinion of that court or of another court where the
forum court has a specific rule prohibiting any reference in briefs to [unpublished opinions]."
219. See, e.g., John J. Cleary, Public Comment 03-AP-242, Proposed Federal Rule of
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I fear judges underestimate the level of frustration with local rules. In the eight
years that I have served as a reporter to an advisory committee, no concern has
been raised more often or more angrily-not just in the Advisory Committee on
FRAP, but in the Standing Committee and the other advisory committees. My
own committee, for example, has heard from many practitioners who have
reached the limits of their patience with having briefs "bounced" by circuit
clerks for failure to comply with one nitpicky22 0 local rule or another. The
newest member of the Standing Committee, in his "maiden comments" at a
Standing Committee meeting, said that a lawyer in his firm who manages to
submit a brief without having the clerk demand corrections is figuratively
carried around the office on the shoulders of his or her colleagues. This
member-a highly respected appellate lawyer working at one of the nation's
most prestigious law firms-was visibly angry when describing the impact that
the proliferation of local rules has on his firm's practice.22'
Judges ignore this problem at their peril. One of these days, a powerful
attorney (such as the Attorney General) is going to get a brief bounced because
he or she overlooked a nitpicky local rule, that attorney is going to call a friend
who is a senator or congressman, and Congress is going to fix the local-rules
problem for judges. Lest I be accused of exaggerating, let me note that, in
1998, a member of the Standing Committee strongly denounced the
Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 1-2 (Feb. 1, 2004) (opposing Rule 32.1), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-242.pdf; Procter Hug, Jr., Public
Comment 03-AP-063, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 3 (Dec. 16,2003)
(same), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP-063.pdf; Alex
Kozinski, Public Comment 03-AP- 169, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, at
17-20 (Jan. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Kozinski Comment] (same), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-169.pdf; Daniel P. Tokaji, Public
Comment 03-AP-045, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Dec. 2, 2003)
(same), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdffiles/Comments/03-AP-045.pdf.
220. My favorite example of the "nitpickiness" of local rules is Second Circuit Local Rule
32(c), which requires that the docket number of a case appear on the cover of the brief and
appendix in type that is at least one inch high. Why Second Circuit judges-apparently alone
among federal and state judges-need inch-high numbers on the covers of their briefs and
appendices is a mystery.
221. These comments-and those of other Standing Committee members-are referred to
in the minutes of the meeting:
One member complained that local rule requirements for briefs appear to be
proliferating, change frequently, are generally confusing, and can be a snare for
attorneys. Other participants added that many of the variations are not justified,
and some urged the rules committees to be more active in promoting national
uniformity.
Minutes of the January 2005 Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 8,
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/Rul05-O I not.pdf.
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proliferation of local rules and moved that the advisory committees be
instructed to prepare amendments to the rules of practice and procedure that
would limit local rules to twenty per court (with each discrete subpart counting
as a separate rule). 222 This measure-which many judges would view as
draconian-failed by only a single vote.223 Someday a similarly draconian
proposal will be approved. The level of frustration with local rules is very high
and likely played some role in the controversy over Rule 32.1.
I suspect that one final reason why some lawyers so adamantly supported
Rule 32.1 is because they perceived it as an attack on the entire institution of
unpublished opinions. I personally do not view Rule 32.1 as such an attack.
Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.1 went out of its way to be
clear that the rule did not forbid any court to issue an unpublished opinion,
dictate the circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an
opinion as unpublished, or imply anything about what effect a court must give
to one of its unpublished opinions.22 4 Nevertheless, I do not doubt that some of
those who supported Rule 32.1 did so because they saw it as the first step on a
path that will eventually lead to a requirement that all dispositions be
accompanied by precedential opinions.
Some of the more general opposition to the institution of unpublished
opinions is undoubtedly motivated by legal or policy concerns-such as Judge
Richard S. Arnold's view that federal judges may not, consistently with Article
III, declare that they will treat only some of their prior decisions as
precedential. 225 But much of the opposition seems more personal. In my
conversations with practitioners, I have sensed relatively little anger about times
222. Minutes of the January 1998 Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/stl-98.htm.
223. Id.
224. The Advisory Committee Note said:
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It takes no position on whether refusing to treat
an "unpublished" opinion as binding precedent is constitutional. It does not require
any court to issue an "unpublished" opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It
does not dictate the circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an
opinion as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must follow in
making that decision. It says nothing about what effect a court must give to one of
its "unpublished" opinions or to the "unpublished" opinions of another court. The
one and only issue addressed by Rule 32.1 is the citation ofjudicial dispositions
that have been designatedas "unpublished" or "non-precedential" by a federal or
state court-whether or not those dispositions have been published in some way or
are precedential in some sense.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 8, at 33-34 (citations omitted).
225. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir. 2000), vacatedas moot,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

1474

62 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005)

that they were not able to cite an unpublished opinion (although such anger
clearly exists), but a lot of anger about times that they received an unpublished
opinion. Fairly or not, lawyers sometimes view unpublished opinions as a slap
in the face. It is one thing to lose a case, they say, but another to be told by the
court that the issues they raised did not even merit a published opinion. 226 It
seems that just about every experienced appellate lawyer is able to describe
with fresh anger an occasion on which he or she received an unpublished
opinion in a case that he or she viewed as important and difficult.
The resentment toward unpublished opinions goes beyond what they
imply about the merits of the losing attorney's case. Unpublished opinions are
most often issued in cases in which oral argument was not permitted. Thus, an
attorney can file a notice of appeal, brief that appeal, and lose that appeal,
without ever coming face-to-face with a judicial officer. The importance of
procedural values-and especially the importance of feeling that one was
heard-is something that law students are taught beginning with the first day of
Civil Procedure. I sometimes tell my Civil Procedure students about a case that
I lost years ago in the Eighth Circuit. 227 The Eighth Circuit reversed parts of
two injunctions in my clients' favor on the grounds that they violated the AntiInjunction Act.228 The chief argument in my brief and in my oral argumentan argument based on an Eighth Circuit precedent directly on point (and
published!)-was that the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to the injunctions
at issue. In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit did not even mention my argument;
it acted as though my clients and I did not exist. Later, in denying my petition
for rehearing, the panel snippily claimed that the reason it had ignored my
argument is that I had not preserved it by presenting it to the district court. The
court was dead wrong; I had made the argument before the district court, which
is why my very capable adversaries had not so much as hinted that I had failed
to preserve it, and which is (presumably) why none of the Eighth Circuit judges
breathed a word about this concern at oral argument. The important point is
that I lost an appeal based on a false assumption that I had no chance to
address-not in my brief, not at oral argument, not in a supplemental brief, and
not in a rehearing petition. It felt like a judicial mugging. I still get angry
226. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtuesand Casual Vices in the
FederalCourts ofAppeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 711 (2001) ("A party whose appeal is
decided without oral argument, and whose arguments are summarily dismissed in a brief,
unpublished opinion, is unlikely to be satisfied-not only because she did not prevail, but also
because of the appearance that the court did not treat her appeal seriously.").
227. For the curious, the case was National Basketball Association v. Minnesota
ProfessionalBasketballLtd. Partnership,56 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 1995).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
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thinking about that case, not because I lost-I lost plenty of cases-but because
I was not given the chance to be heard.
Judges insist that they are as careful to make certain that the result is
correct in appeals that terminate in unpublished opinions as they are in appeals
that terminate in published opinions. Many practitioners simply do not believe
them. But whether or not this is true, the appearance of justice is as important
as the fact ofjustice. Practitioners who receive unpublished opinions often feel
that they were not heard. That feeling makes them resent the very institution of
the unpublished opinion, and that resentment, in turn, makes them support
anything that might be seen as a slap at that institution-such as Rule 32.1.
B. Opponents of Rule 32.1
As noted above, much of the strongest opposition to Rule 32.1 has come
from judges. 229 Like practitioners, judges are not of one mind. Some of the
best arguments in favor of Rule 32.1 that I have heard have been made by
judges at meetings of the Advisory Committee or Standing Committee, and all
of the appellate judges on the Advisory Committee (including Judges Alito and
Roberts) have supported Rule 32.1. But just as it is mainly practitioners who
drive the support for Rule 32.1, it is mainly judges who drive the opposition.
Why, then, do judges feel so strongly about a rule that, according to all
available evidence, is highly unlikely to have much impact on them?
One reason, I suppose, is that judges are unaware of the evidence, or they
do not think the evidence is strong, or they believe that evidence about what has
occurred in other jurisdictions is a poor predictor of what will occur in their
circuit. It is important to bear in mind that, in the view of some judges, the
margin for error here is small. The caseloads of federal appellate judges have
risen dramatically in recent decades. In 1960, when there were sixty-eight
authorized judgeships, 3899 appeals were filed in the federal courts of
appeals-about fifty-seven per judge.230 In 2004, when there were 167
authorized judgeships, 62,762 appeals were filed-about 376 per judge.231
229. See Spring 1998 Minutes, supranote 43, at pt. V.C (noting the chiefjudges' strong
opposition to Rule 32.1).
230. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl. 1.3 (2005), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/tablel.03.pdf.
231. Id. The tremendous growth in the caseloads of the federal courts generally-and the
federal appellate courts specifically-has been examined in numerous sources. E.g., THOMAS E.
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U. S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31-51
(1994); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supranote 22, at 4-10, 109-10; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 53-86 (1996).
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Of course, a dramatic increase in caseloads does not necessarily
translate into an equivalent increase in workloads. 32 The workload of a
judge depends not just on the number of appeals filed per judge, but on
such factors as the percentage of appeals that are abandoned after the
notice of appeal is filed but before the case is briefed (either because the
case is settled or because the appellant concludes that he or she is not
likely to prevail); 233 the difficulty of the appeals that are decided on the
merits;234 the quantity and quality of the support personnel-such as law
clerks and staff attorneys-who are available to the judges; 235 the
percentage of appeals that involve oral argument; 236 the length of typical
232. See POSNER, supra note 231, at 64, 67-79 (explaining how procedural terminations,
per curiam opinions, and unpublished opinions lighten appellate courts' workloads).
233. The AO refers to these as "procedural" terminations, and they are more common than
one might think. In fiscal year 2004, a total of 56,381 appeals were terminated. ADMIN. OFFICE
OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT

STATISTICS: COURTS OF APPEALS,

at

http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html [hereinafter MANAGEMENT STATISTICS]. Ofthose,
over half were either "procedural" terminations (26,835) or terminations through
"consolidations and cross appeals" (2108)-two categories of terminations that require little or
no involvement ofjudges. Id. The remainder (27,438) were terminations "on the merits." Id.
234. Some types of appeals are more difficult than others. Judge Richard A. Posner
concluded, after a close examination of the subject matter of the opinions issued by the courts of
appeals since 1960, that "the average case decided by the courts of appeals is... easier today
than in the past." POSNER, supra note 231, at 77; see also Edith H. Jones, A Snapshot of a Fifth
CircuitJudge's Work: Boutique Justice, 33 TEx. TECH L. REv. 529, 538 (2002) ("What has
increased phenomenally during my [seventeen-year] tenure is the volume of the summary
calendar or low workload cases.").
235. The number of support staff has risen substantially. See Cooper & Berman, supra
note 226, at 697-99 (describing "[t]he increased number and influence of law clerks" and "[t]he
growth of the central circuit office"); Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of JudicialEthics, 32
HOFsTRA L. REv. 1095, 1098-99 (2004) (noting that most federal appellate judges were assisted
by one secretary, two law clerks, and a few staff attorneys in the mid-1970s, and that most are
assisted by one secretary, four law clerks, and a large number of staff attorneys today)
[hereinafter Kozinski, JudicialEthics]; Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari,supranote
211, at 287-93 (describing the growth in the number and responsibilities of law clerks, staff
attorneys, and externs).
236. This percentage has declined substantially in recent years:
Year
Total Appeals
After Oral
Percentage
Terminated on Merits
Argument
2004
27,438
8,645
31.5%
1999
26,727
9,924
37.1%
1994
27,219
11,047
40.6%
1989
19,322
9,729
50.4%
1984
14,327
9,061
63.2%
See E-mail from James N. Ishida, Attorney Advisor, Office of Judges Programs, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules (Apr. 18, 2005, 3:29 PM) (providing data for 2004, 1999, and 1994 for the twelve month
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oral arguments; 23 7 and the percentage of appeals that are disposed of without
opinion. 238 But, taking all of this into account, even those who are generally
skeptical of claims that the judiciary is overworked would likely concede that
the workload of judges has risen dramatically 239 and that, in the
busiest
24
circuits, judges are working at or near the limits of their capacity. 0
It is thus easy to understand why judges would strongly oppose Rule
32.1 if they sincerely believed that it would increase their workloads, or even
if they believed that it would create a risk of increasing their workloads.
With the margin for error so small, a judge might reason, why should we run

period ending September 30) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); E-mail from
Catherine Whitaker, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (May 17, 2005, 7:50 AM) (providing data for 1989 and 1984 for
the twelve month period ending June 30) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
237. This has declined over the years. See Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari,
supra note 211, at 279-80 (observing a decrease in length of oral arguments).
238. Contrary to the perception of some judges and lawyers, this percentage has actually
decreased significantly over the past thirty years:
Year
Total Appeals
Summary
Percentage
Terminated on Merits
Dispositions
2004
27,438
775
2.8%
1994
27,219
3,073
11.3%
1984
14,327
1,624
11.3%
1974
8,451
2,052
24.3%
See Rabiej Memorandum, supra note 141, at 22-23.
Of course, during this period of time, several circuits abolished or liberalized their nocitation rules. See id.at 1 (noting that of the nine circuits that permit citation to unpublished
opinions, most adopted the permissive citation policy in the 1990s). The fact that summary
dispositions have declined while no-citation rules have been liberalized seems inconsistent with
the claim of Rule 32.1 's opponents that, if the rule was approved, judges would issue many
more summary dispositions. See, e.g., Kozinski Comment, supra note 219, at 10-11 ("Or
[Ninth Circuit judges might] reduce our unpublished dispositions to one-word judgment orders,
as have [judges of] other circuits.").
239. As explained below, the best readily available measure of the workload of a federal
appellate judge is probably terminations on the merits per active judge. See infra note 241 and
accompanying text (defining the calculation for this measure). The number of terminations on
the merits per active judge rose from eighty-seven in 1974 to a high of 498 in 2001, falling back

to 432 in 2004. See

MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,

supra note 233 (providing data for 2001 and

2004); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS NATIONAL
STATISTICAL PROFILE

(1974) (providing data for 1974) (on file with the Washington and Lee

Law Review).
240. In fiscal year 2003, for example, the average Fifth Circuit judge was involved in 862
merits terminations and wrote 276 opinions for a panel or the en banc court, thirty-three of
which were signed (and thus likely required considerable attention from the judge himself or
herself). MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 233.
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even a modest risk of increasing judges' workloads, especially when Rule
32.1 is unlikely to produce much in the way of practical benefits?
That said, the strong feelings that some judges have regarding Rule 32.1
cannot be explained entirely by workload concerns. There is simply no
correlation between the workload of a judge and the judge's position on Rule
32.1. The best measure of the workload of a federal appellate judge is
probably terminations on the merits per active judge 24 '-roughly speaking,
the number of times each year that a judge must "sign[] off on" a decision
that disposes of a case on the merits. 2 For the year ending September 30,
2004, the three busiest circuits were the Fifth (with 727 terminations on the
merits per active judge), Eleventh (711), and Fourth (522).243 From the
judges on those three circuits-the three circuits that are perennially the
busiest244 -we received a grand total of two comments opposing Rule 32.1:
one from an active judge on the Fourth Circuit 245 and one from a senior judge
on the Fifth Circuit. 246 By contrast, we received strong opposition from the

241. "Terminations on the merits per active judge" is a statistic calculated every year by the
AO and posted on its website as part of the Federal Court Management Statistics. Id. In
calculating the number of terminations on the merits per active judge, the AO considers only
appeals that were disposed of by the court on the merits after submission on the briefs or oral
hearing-as opposed to either "procedural" terminations or terminations through
"consolidations and cross appeals." E-mail from James N. Ishida, Attorney Advisor, Office of
Judges Programs, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, to Patrick J.Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (Apr. 15, 2005, 1:25 PM) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The AO also considers only judges who were active for all twelve months of the
fiscal year. Id. The AO first calculates the total number of "participations" by active judges. Id.
For example, an appeal disposed of by a panel consisting of three active judges would count as
three "participations"; an appeal disposed of by a panel consisting of one visiting judge, one
senior judge, and one active judge would count as one "participation" (unless the visiting judge
was an active circuit judge, in which case it would count as two "participations"); and an appeal
disposed of by an en banc court consisting of eleven active judges and one senior judge would
count as eleven "participations." Id. The AO then divides the total number of participations by
the total number of active judges to arrive at "terminations on the merits per active judge." Id.
242. Kozinski, JudicialEthics, supranote 235, at 1097.
243. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 233.
244. The AO's website reports circuit-by-circuit data on terminations on the merits per
active judge going back to 1992. See MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 233 (reporting
statistics from 1992 through 2004). Year in and year out, the judges of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits have had the heaviest workloads.
245. M. Blane Michael, Public Comment 03-AP-401, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/
Comments/03-AP-401 .pdf.
246. Thomas M. Reavley, Public Comment 03-AP-170, Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 (Jan. 21, 2004), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/
Comments/03-AP-I 70.pdf.
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judges on the Second (260),247 Seventh (349),248 and Eighth (399)249
Circuits-all of which have workloads below the national average (432) and,
in the case of the Second Circuit, a workload that is about a third of the busiest
circuit's. We also received strong opposition from the judges of the Federal
Circuit,250 but that circuit, alone among the circuits, does not disclose the data
needed by the AO to calculate terminations on the merits per active judge.
From other data that are available, though, I estimate that the workload of
Federal Circuit judges is well below the national average.2 5'
In short, most of the opposition to Rule 32.1 was heard from judges with
below-average workloads (the Ninth Circuit (490) was the exception 252), while
almost no opposition to Rule 32.1 was heard from judges with above-average
workloads. When almost no objection to Rule 32.1 has been heard from the
judges with the heaviest workloads, and when all available evidence suggests
that liberalizing citation rules does not cause more work for judges,25 3
something other than concern about workloads must be animating judges.254
I have described three reasons why practitioners so adamantly oppose nocitation rules: practitioners believe that they are inconsistent with important
civic values,255 practitioners are frustrated with the proliferation of local
247. Walker Comment, supranote 174.
248. Coffey Comment, supra note 175.
249. Loken Comment, supra note 176.
250. Mayer Comment, supranote 177.
251. The Federal Circuit-a court of twelve active judges-reported that, during the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2004, a total of 1138 appeals were terminated "by
judges." LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 117 tbl.B-8 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b8.pdf. The Tenth Circuit-also a court of
twelve active judges-reported that, during the same twelve-month period, a total of 1349
appeals were terminated "on the merits." MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supranote 233. The AO
calculated terminations on the merits per active judge for the Tenth Circuit as 254, the second
lowest in the nation (behind the D.C. Circuit). Id. It is likely that, if the Federal Circuit had
supplied the AO with the data it needed to calculate terminations on the merits per active judge,
the Federal Circuit's number for 2004 would have been roughly similar to the Tenth Circuit's.
252. See Alito Memorandum 2005, supranote 8, at 94-96 (listing Ninth Circuit judges).
253. REAGAN ET AL., supranote 1, at 12-13, 42-43 tbls.N-O.
254. One additional fact causes me to doubt that the passionate opposition of judges is
fueled entirely by workload concerns: The workload of federal appellate judges has remained
quite steady over the past decade. See Jones, supranote 234, at 529 ("[I]t is not realistic still to
be crying 'wolf over the level of appellate work; the wolf seems to have retreated for the
moment."). In 1994, the typical judge helped dispose of 459 cases on the merits; in 2004, the
number was 432. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 233. In 1994, the typical judge wrote
158 opinions, of which 54 were signed, and in 2004, the typical judge wrote 144 opinions, of
which 47 were signed. Id.
255. Supra Part III.A.
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rules, 256 and practitioners want to undermine the institution of unpublished

opinions. 257 Much of the explanation for why judges so adamantly support nocitation rules is likely the "flip side" of these three reasons.
First, as described above, a lot of the fervor against no-citation rules can
be explained by the fact that such rules are seen as offending important civic
values, such as freedom of speech and judicial accountability. 25 Arguments
based on such values may seem noble to those making them, but they can
appear overblown and even insulting to those on the receiving end. Judges are
likely to react one way when told, for example, that no-citation rules prevent
parties from citing unpublished opinions in certain situations in which such
citation might serve a purpose. Judges are likely to react differently when they
are accused of violating the right to free speech or using no-citation rules to
bury improper decisions. Such arguments, when made stridently, are going to
provoke strident responses, and those, in turn, will provoke strident repliesand up and up the decibel level will go.
No judge ever likes to be accused of acting contrary to fundamental
American values or of failing to do his or her job, but now is a particularly
sensitive time to be criticizing federal judges. A number of factors have
combined to depress the morale of federal judges: inadequate funding of the
federal judiciary, 259 salaries that are a fraction of what top lawyers earn, 260 a
sentencing system viewed by some judges as "cruel and rigid, 261 (flaws made
256. Supra Part III.A.
257. Supra Part III.A.
258. Supra Part III.A.
259. See CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1, 2 (2005) (addressing "the funding crisis

currently affecting the federal Judiciary" and reporting that "[t]he continuing uncertainties and
delays in the funding process, along with rising fixed costs that outpace any increased funding
from Congress, have required many courts to impose hiring freezes, furloughs, and reductions in
force"), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.
pdf; Mark Hamblett, Lawyers FightBack over Cuts in U.S. Courts,NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 2004,
at 4 (quoting John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, as saying: "I've been a
judge now for 19 years, and the budget situation has never been as bad as it is now.").
260. In 2003, the average compensation for a partner at one of America's 100 highestgrossing law firms was $825,500. Alison Frankel, The Am Law 100 2004, AM. LAW., July
2004, at 92, 92-93. In the 2003 fiscal year, a federal appellate judge was paid $164,000. AM.
BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY: AN UPDATE ON THE URGENT NEED FOR

ACTION 25 (May 2003), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/judgespayaction.pdf.
261. See John S. Martin, Jr., Let JudgesDo TheirJobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,2003, at A31
(attributing the author's decision to retire from the federal bench to "being part of a sentencing
system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid"). Judge Myron H. Bright was one of the most
outspoken judicial critics of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Flores,
336 F.3d 760, 765-68 (8th Cir. 2003) (Bright, J., concurring) (arguing that for "fair and proper
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worse by the Feeney Amendment262), ethical rules that are perceived as both
intrusive and ineffective,263 poor relations with Congress,264 and now
heightened fears of personal safety in light of the Lefkow murders.265 Ifjudges
are a bit touchy at criticism these days, one can understand why.
sentencing procedures," sentencing judges require more discretion than that allowed under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
262. The Feeney Amendment was an amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.). The amendment (sponsored by Representative Tom Feeney) included a number of
provisions that made it more difficult for judges to exercise discretion in sentencing, including a
requirement that judges who depart downward from federal sentencing guidelines be reported to
Congress. The Feeney Amendment was strongly opposed by federal judges. REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: SEPTEMBER 23,2003, at 5-6
(2003), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sept03proc.pdf; see also CHIEF JUSTICE
WtIAM H. REHNQUIST, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2004) ("[T]he PROTECT Act was enacted without any consideration
of the views of the Judiciary."), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2003year-endreport.html; Marcia Coyle, DeafEarsfor Rehnquist on Sentencing: 'Feeney'
FracasIs Not Going Away, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 1 (reporting that "[d]espite recent
criticism by federal judges, Congress is unlikely to alter the Feeney Amendment in regard to
federal sentencing guidelines").
The general controversy over the sentencing guidelines-and the specific controversy over
the Feeney Amendment-were largely mooted by UnitedStates v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 75657 (2005), in which the Supreme Court declared invalid "the provision of the federal sentencing
statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory," thereby "mak[ing] the Guidelines effectively
advisory."
263. Judge Kozinski has described the financial disclosure requirements imposed on
federal judges as "anuisance and a bit dangerous and intrusive," Kozinski, Judicial Ethics,
supra note 235, at 1104, and he has referred to the "[t]he idea that [he] would give up [his]
honest judgment in a case for a few dollars" as "ludicrous and insulting," id. at 1105. Judge
Kozinski has also complained that "many of the things contained within the Canons [of Judicial
Ethics] ...are wholly irrelevant in practice. They make no difference at all." Id
264. See Mike Allen, GOP Seeks More Curbs on Courts: Sensenbrenner Proposesan
InspectorGeneral,WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at A3 (describing efforts of"ang[ry] ...House
Republican leaders to ...use budgetary, oversight and disciplinary authority to assert greater
control over the federal courts"); Jeff Chorney, O'Connor to Judges: Meet with Congress
Members,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 2004, at S9 (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as describing
the relations between Congress and the judiciary as "more tense than at any time in my
lifetime"); Marcia Coyle, A CaucusIs Formed, and Other Efforts Aim to Mend Chasm, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 18, 2004, at 1 ("[T]he degree of tension between Congress and the judiciary today
hasn't been experienced for at least half a century, according to political and legal observers.").
265. See Bethany Broida, Judges ShareSafety Fears,Askfor Help, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 25,
2005, at 1 ("Off-site security has been an issue of considerable concern, especially among
federal judges. In the past 25 years, three federal judges have been killed-all at their homes.
The murder of Judge Lefkow's family in her Chicago home is only the most recent incident.");
Carol D. Leonnig, Judges Seek to Oust ChiefofU.S. Marshals, WASH. POST, May 16, 2005, at
BI ("Leaders of the federal judiciary have privately urged Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales to consider replacing the director of the U.S. Marshals Service, complaining that weak
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Second, I argued above that the intensity of some of the opposition to
unpublished opinions likely arises from frustration with the proliferation of
local rules.266 Those local rules exist because judges want them to exist.
Judges like to run their courts as they see fit, and more generally, judges do not
like to be told what to do, especially when it comes to how they conduct
business inside of their chambers. In this, judges resemble no one as much as
tenured law professors, who also do not like to be told what to do, especially
when it comes to how they teach their classes and do their research. One need
only consider the scrum that is the annual clerkship hiring season, 267 or the
almost comical dysfunction of the typical faculty meeting, to appreciate how
difficult it can be to regulate intelligent, strong-willed people who are used to
getting their own way and who have no real fear of being fired, being demoted,
or having their salaries reduced.
Although some judges acknowledge the problem posed by the
proliferation of local rules, many do not-and, in fact, some routinely express
frustration with what they view as the hyperactivity of Judicial Conference
committees. Judges complain in particular that the rules of practice and
procedure are amended too frequently and that those rules too often address
subjects that should be left to the discretion of the judges. (I do not believe that
this complaint has merit, at least as to FRAP. 268) Some judges have told me
management has left judges and courthouses in danger... ."); Tony Mauro, Top FederalJudges
Call for Increased Security, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 2005, at 7 (reporting that the Judicial
Conference had approved a resolution "describing the 'crisis in off-site judicial security' as a
matter 'of the gravest concern to the federal judiciary"').
266. Supra Parts III.A & III.B.
267. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship
Selection Process, 59 MD. L. REv. 129, 131-38 (2000) (comparing the judicial clerkship
selection process to jungle law); Christopher Avery et al., The Marketfor FederalJudicialLaw
Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 793, 801-04 (2001) (describing the hiring season as a "rough-andtumble process"); Edward R. Becker et al., The FederalJudicialLaw ClerkHiringProblem and
the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207, 215-20 (1994) (finding that although the
March 1 interview deadline helped to alleviate some of the judicial hiring frenzy, rumors still
plagued the process and judges outside of the East Coast felt disadvantaged); Alex Kozinski,
Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1707-20 (1991) (arguing that the high
pressured competitive atmosphere of the judicial clerkship selection process allows both
applicants and judges to view how the other responds to high-stress situations); Trenton H.
Norris, The JudicialClerkship Selection Process: An Applicant'sPerspectiveon BadApples,
Sour Grapes,and FruitfulReform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 765, 772-82 (1993) (likening the process of
selecting law clerks to a "feeding frenzy"); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, On
ClerkshipSelection: A Reply to the Bad Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097, 1108 (1992) (calling the
clerkship hiring process "anarchic"); Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REv.
152, 154 (1990) (calling the clerkship selection process an "annual chase").
268. FRAP has been amended only twice since 1995-in 1998 (when the restyled rules
took effect) and in 2002.
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that this "pro-autonomy" or "anti-uniformity" sentiment is particularly strong in
such high-profile circuits as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuitswhich, not surprisingly (if this is true), are three of the circuits that have
most strongly opposed Rule 32.1.
Ironically, Rule 32.1 may have made a good battleground for a fight
between the practitioners who are angry about local rules and the judges
who are angry about attacks on local rules precisely because so little is at
Some practitioners
stake (at least in terms of practical effects).
undoubtedly thought, "Even on a matter as trivial as citing unpublished
opinions, the circuits insist on going their own ways!" At the same time,
some judges undoubtedly thought, "Even on a matter as trivial as citing
unpublished opinions, the national rulemakers will not leave us alone!"
Third, I argued above that some practitioners pushed strongly for Rule
32.1 because they expected or at least hoped that it would be a first step
toward abolishing the institution of unpublished opinions.2 69 Many judges
likely pushed strongly against Rule 32.1 for the same reason: They, too,
expect-or at least fear-that Rule 32.1 will be the first step down a
slippery slope that will lead to judges being required to issue published
precedential opinions in all cases.
Several judges who oppose Rule 32.1 have told me privately that what
really concerns them is not that unpublished opinions will be cited, but that
courts will eventually be forced to treat unpublished opinions as
precedential. The courts of appeals have issued hundreds of thousands of
unpublished opinions, and judges have no idea what is in them. They
know, however, that those opinions generally are not as well crafted as
published opinions and often were not carefully scrutinized by any judge.
Judges are terrified that they will wake up one day and find themselves
bound by this mountain of unpublished opinions. Adding to the terror is
the fact that all circuits hold that one panel cannot overrule another
panel, 270 which means that, if unpublished opinions become binding
269. Supra Part III.A.
270. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ErAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3981.1,
at 612-13 (3d ed. 1999) ("The courts of appeals generally follow a practice that one panel is
bound by the decision of another panel of that court. Only the court sitting en banc can overrule
the panel decision. This is true even of unpublished opinions .... ."). Some circuits vary from
this procedure by permitting a panel to overrule a prior decision of the court if the panel first
circulates its opinion to the entire court and, depending on the circuit, either no judge objects,
see, e.g., United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 n.l (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that circuit
precedent can only be overruled by an en banc vote or by an opinion circulated to all judges
with none objecting), or a majority of judges do not vote to hear the case en banc, see, e.g.,
Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2004) (overruling a prior opinion when the
current panel opinion had been circulated with a majority of the circuit judges declining to hear
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precedent, the en banc court will have to correct every mistake in such an
opinion.271 Judges have told me that being forced to treat their unpublished
opinions as binding precedent would create chaos and that it would take
decades to repair the damage.
Rule 32.1 would not, of course, require courts to treat their
unpublished opinions as binding precedent. Nothing in the text of the rule
requires such a result, and the Advisory Committee Note bent over
backwards to make clear that the rule "takes no position on whether
refusing to treat an 'unpublished' opinion as binding precedent is
constitutional" and that the rule "says nothing about what effect a court
must give to one of its 'unpublished' opinions or to the 'unpublished'
opinions of another court." 272 Still, I suspect that many judges put up a stiff
fight against Rule 32.1 not because they strongly object to permitting
citation, but because they fear that citation will inevitably lead to treatment
as binding precedent. In this, they acted like an army that, to forestall an
invasion of its own country, marched out to meet an approaching enemy in
a country some distance away.
I confess to having some sympathy for these judges. I say this not
because I have any doubts about the intentions of the Advisory Committee.
As best as I can recall, no member of the Advisory Committee has ever
expressed an interest in amending FRAP to require precedential treatment
of unpublished opinions. Indeed, I am confident that every member of the
Advisory Committee believes that such a proposal would exceed the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act.273 I have no doubt that the Advisory
Committee will maintain a firm line between citation and precedential
force.

the case en banc).
271. Professor Stephen R. Barnett has pointed out that the law-of-the-circuit rule was
created by judges and can be changed byjudges. See Barnett, Ground Shifts, supranote 11, at
23-24 ("While it has been suggested that the law-of-the-circuit rule rests on constitutional, or at
least statutory, compulsion, neither appears to be the case."). He has suggested, among other
things, that courts could "accord unpublished opinions 'precedential' status that requires
overruling, but... lift the law-of-the-circuit rule to let subsequent panels overrule them." Id. at
23.
272. PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 8, at 33.
273. A rule that prescribed the legal force that must be accorded unpublished opinions
would likely "abridge, enlarge or modify" the "substantive right[s]" of the parties and thus
proposing such a rule is likely beyond the authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
The Rules Enabling Act has apparently escaped the attention of some of those who have
criticized the Advisory Committee for doing "next to nothing" to address the "legal force of
unpublished opinions." Ununpublished,GREEN BAG, Winter 2004, at 105, 107.
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Judges realize, however, that the main reason why attorneys want to
cite unpublished opinions lies not in the quality of their analysis or
research. Unpublished opinions are, for the most part, pretty useless 2as
75
274
expositors of the law, which is why most judges find them unhelpful.
Rather, parties want to cite unpublished opinions as part of an argument that,
because a court acted in a particular way in a prior case, the court should act
in the same way in the present case. True, the party would not be able to
claim that the prior unpublished decision bound the court, but in all other
respects the argument would be an argument from precedent. Judges fear
that, the more such arguments are made, the more difficult it will be for
courts to hold the line against treating unpublished opinions as binding.
I will close by offering one final theory about why many judges oppose
Rule 32.1 so passionately. I call this the "Henry Friendly" theory, after
legendary federal appellate judge Henry J. Friendly. I confess at the outset
that Judge Friendly probably would not like my theory because it involves a
lot of speculation and amateur psychoanalysis. But I offer it for what it is
worth.
When today's judges were law students and young lawyers, Judge
Friendly was the preeminent circuit judge in America, a mantle that he
inherited from Learned Hand. When one thought of appellate judging, one
thought of Judge Friendly. And when one thought of Judge Friendly, one
thought of a judicial craftsman. One imagined Judge Friendly in his
chambers reading every word of every brief, poring over the record himself,
vigorously debating the case with his clerks, fencing with attorneys at oral
argument, engaging in spirited discussions with his colleagues in conference,
and then painstakingly crafting an opinion in longhand. One imagined Judge
Friendly acting this way in large part because Judge Friendly in fact acted
this way.276 When today's judges were appointed to the bench, they accepted
274. See Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari,supranote 211, at 284 (discussing the
quality of unpublished opinions). The authors assert:
It should come as no surprise that unpublished dispositions are also dreadful in
quality. In a study conducted fifteen years ago, we found that twenty percent of
unpublished opinions in nine of the eleven circuits failed to satisfy a very
undemanding definition of minimum standards, and that sixty percent of the
opinions in three circuits failed to meet those standards. There is no reason to think
that the situation has improved in the years since.
Id. (citing Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 11, at 602).
275. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11, 39 tbl.K.
276. Judge Friendly's approach to his work is discussed in several of the tributes published
by the HarvardLaw Review after Judge Friendly's death. Bruce A. Ackerman et al., In
Memoriam: HenryJ Friendly,99 HARV. L. Rv. 1709, 1710-11 (1986).
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their appointments in part because it gave them
the opportunity to exercise
2 77
the craft of judging, just like Judge Friendly.
Judges are also proud people. They care about their reputations, and
they care about their legacies. Those reputations-and those legacies-are
almost entirely a function ofjudges' opinions. Justice Louis Brandeis, when
asked whether he was writing his memoirs, reportedly said: "I think you will
find that my memoirs have already been written." 278 He was referring, of
course, to his opinions. The giants of the federal appellate bench in the
twentieth century-Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, Richard Posner-owe
their reputations in no small part to the fact that they wrote their own
opinions. 279 After Judge Friendly died, the HarvardLawReview published a
series of tributes in his honor. 280 The very first sentence of the very first
tribute was: "Henry Friendly did his own work. 2 8' Few judges can write all
of their own opinions today,282 but they still aspire to leave a respected and
influential body of work. Judges have a strong sense of ownership in their
opinions283 -which itself explains much of the strong feeling about Rule
32.1.

277. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 226, at 708 (asserting that many federal appellate
judges today "express a wistful longing for the days of the Learned Hand model"); Kozinski,
JudicialEthics, supra note 235, at 1097 ("When lawyers seek appointment to judicial office,
they generally think of the interesting cases as the core of judicial work; none I know seeks
judicial office so he can spend his days, nights, weekends and holidays slogging through an
unending stack of routine, fact-intensive and largely (in the grand scheme of things)
inconsequential cases.").
278. Paul A. Freund, Introductionto ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, at xv (Univ. of Chi. Press 1967). Brandeis's line was quoted by
Judge Michael Boudin, a former Friendly clerk, in a tribute to Judge Friendly. Michael Boudin,
Memoirs in a ClassicalStyle, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984).
279. See WILLAM DOMNARSKi, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 122-23 (1996) (describing
how Judge Learned Hand wrote his own opinions and how Judge Posner continues in this
tradition); Ackerman et al., supra note 276, at 1709 (describing how Judge Friendly carefully
constructed his own opinions).
280. Ackerman et al., supra note 276, at 1709-27.
281. Id.at 1709.
282. See DomNAPsmI, supra note 279, at 122 ("(O]nly three or four federal judges...
write[] every word of every opinion."); Kozinski, JudicialEthics,supra note 235, at 1100 ("It is
a reality of current judicial life that few judges draft their own opinions from scratch."); Richard
A. Posner, The MaterialBasis ofJurisprudence,69 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1993) ("Today ...the vast
majority ofjudicial opinions at all appellate levels are drafted by law clerks ....[Only a] tiny
and shrinking minority of old-fashioned appellate judges.., continue to write their own
opinions.... .").
283. This sense of ownership may explain the rather remarkable fact that some courts have
adopted local rules that purport to bar parties not just from citing the court's unpublished
opinions to the court itself, but also from citing the court's unpublished opinions to any other
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As caseloads have risen, however, the role of the appellate judge has
increasingly evolved from thoughtfil crafter of opinions to harried manager
of litigation-from head chef at a gourmet restaurant to short-order cook at a
roadside diner. Consider, for example, the way that the Ninth Circuit handles
about 40% of its merits dispositions: A three-judge panel will assemble to
decide fifty or more cases in a single day. The judges will generally not read
the briefs, the records, or anything else in advance. Instead, they will rely
entirely on an oral description of the case provided by a staff attorney. The
staff attorney will describe how he or she believes the case should be
resolved and present an opinion that he or she has drafted. The panel will
glance at the opinion, give its consent, and move on to the next case.28 4 It is
not uncommon for an appeal to be disposed of in this manner in as few as

court-state or federal. The Second Circuit, for example, provides in its local rule that its
unpublished opinions "shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any
other court." 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (emphasis added). It is not clear where the Second Circuit gets
the authority to bar, say, a resident of Montana who has never stepped foot in the Second Circuit
from citing an unpublished opinion of the Second Circuit to a Montana state trial judge.
Ironically, the Second Circuit judges were the only opponents of Rule 32.1 who argued
that the rule was "beyond the scope of the rulemaking authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072." Walker
Comment, supra note 174, at 5. The Second Circuit judges argued that Rule 32.1 is not a
"general rule[] of practice and procedure" because, if Rule 32.1 is adopted, "some judges will
make the opinion more elaborate in order to make clear the context of the ruling, while other
judges will shorten the opinion in order to provide less citable material .... ." Id. Of course, the
no-citation rules that Rule 32.1 seeks to abolish are themselves promulgated under Appellate
Rule 47(a), which gives each court of appeals authority to "make and amend rules governing its
practice." FED. R. App. P. 47(a). The Second Circuit did not explain why it has power to use its
local rules to bar citation-not only in the Second Circuit, but all federal and state courts in the
land-but the Supreme Court does not have power to use FRAP to permit citation in the federal
appellate courts. If the Second Circuit's no-citation rule is a rule of"practice" for purposes of
Rule 47(a), then surely Rule 32.1 is a rule of "practice" for purposes of § 2072.
284. I base this description on published accounts. See, e.g., Kozinski, JudicialEthics,
supranote 235, at 1099 (describing how staff attorneys "process approximately forty percent of
cases in which [the Ninth Circuit] issue[s] a merits ruling"); Alex Kozinski & Stephen
Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don'tAllow Citation to UnpublishedOpinions,
CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 44 (describing how Ninth Circuit judges merely ensure that the
unpublished opinions written by staff attorneys reach the proper result). I also base it on
comments that Ninth Circuit judges submitted regarding Rule 32.1. See, e.g., Marsha S.
Berzon, Public Comment 03-AP-134, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, at 1
(Jan. 13, 2004) (describing the "screening process" of cases where judges rely "heavily on
central staff review and drafting"), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/
Comments/03-AP-134.pdf; Kozinski Comment, supranote 219, at 4-5 (describing how during
the screening program judges make a decision after a presentation by the central staff); Barry G.
Silverman, Public Comment 03-AP-075, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, at
1 (Dec. 17, 2003) (describing staff attorneys' central role in the screening panels), availableat
http://www.secretjustice.org/ pdf files/Comments/03-AP-075.pdf.
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five minutes. 2 8 Judge Kozinski likens the opinions produced by this process
2 86
to "sausage" that is "not safe for human consumption.
I believe that some of the emotion surrounding the issue of unpublished
opinions relates to the perceived gap between the gem-producing judging of
Judge Friendly's era and the sausage-producing judging of the present era. I
should stress that, although this gap unquestionably exists, this gap also may
be larger in perception than in reality. One must be careful not to idealize the
past or demonize the present. Judge Friendly was, after all, only one judge,
and he was famous because he was atypical. It makes little sense to compare
the typical judge of today to the titan of yesterday and then lament the gap.
Also, Judge Friendly himself almost surely did not give the "Friendly
treatment" to every case. Undoubtedly, the Second Circuit of the 1970slike the Second Circuit of today-had its share of easy cases (referred to as
"dogs" by some judges). I would be surprised if Judge Friendly pored over
the record and debated with his clerks in those cases.
At the same time, not all unpublished opinions are sausage. The
approach of the Ninth Circuit is not the approach of the other circuits---or
even the approach of the Ninth Circuit itself in many cases that result in
unpublished opinions. The attention devoted to unpublished opinions falls
along a spectrum, just as the attention devoted to published opinions does.
This is as it should be. Critics of the federal judiciary often fail to recognize
that many appeals are extremely easy, and judges can adequately consider
them in a few minutes-especially when assisted by able staff attorneys and
law clerks. Insisting that judges give the Friendly treatment to every case is
as unreasonable as insisting that doctors personally administer a full battery
of medical tests to every child with an ear infection.

285. Judge Kozinski has been admirably candid in describing how difficult it is for judges
to make certain that "judging" is being done under such a system:
The increase in caseload coupled with the proliferation of staff creates a
constant temptation for judges to give away essential pieces of their job. The
pressure is most severe in the small and seemingly routine cases, especially those
handled through the screening process. After you dispose of a few dozen such
cases on a screening calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders and the
urge to say okay to whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible ....
It often takes a frantic act of will to continue questioning successive staff attorneys
about each case, or to insist on reading key parts of the record or controlling
precedent to ensure that the case is decided by the three judges whose names
appear in the caption, not by a single staff attorney.
Kozinski, JudicialEthics, supra note 235, at 1099 (citations omitted).
286. Kozinski, In Opposition, supra note 11, at 37.
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That said, the notion that the Friendly treatment 287 is somehow the norm,
and that judging that falls short of the Friendly treatment is somehow a
failure, has a powerful hold on the imagination of the legal profession, giving
judges conflicted feelings about unpublished opinions. On the one hand,
judges recognize unpublished opinions as a necessity, and they fiercely protect
their right to issue them. Only by issuing unpublished opinions can judges have
the time to perform their best work in difficult cases-the work that will most
shape their reputations and their legacies. On the other hand, judges view
unpublished opinions with discomfort or even embarrassment. Every day,
judges are forced to put their name on work that is not theirs--on words that
they may have barely read, much less written-on results to which they have
given only a few moments' thought.
I wonder whether one reason why some judges react so strongly against
the citation of unpublished opinions is because, when a party cites such an
opinion, the judges feel guilty--or at least feel that the party is trying to make
them feel guilty. Consider the following reasons given by a group of Seventh
Circuit judges for opposing Rule 32.1:
[Unpublished orders will be] thrown back in our faces .... no matter how
often we state that unpublished orders though citable (if the proposed rule
is adopted) are not precedents. For if a lawyer states in its brief that in our
unpublished opinion in A v. B[] we said X and in C v. D we said Y and in
this case the other side wants us to say Z, we can hardly reply that when we
don't publish we say what we please and take no responsibility. We will
have a moral duty to explain, distinguish, reaffirm, overrule, etc. any
unpublished order brought to our attention by counsel. Citability would
upgrade case-specific orders that this circuit has intentionally confined to
the law 288of that particular case to de facto precedents that we must
address.
287. What I have described as "the Friendly treatment" is similar to what William M.
Richman and William L. Reynolds have described as the "traditional" or "Learned Hand"
approach:
Oral argument is heard in virtually all cases. Following a thorough discussion
among the judges in a face-to-face conference, one panel member prepares a draft
opinion, circulates the opinion among the panel, and then revises the draft in
response to their comments. The resulting opinion carefully states the relevant
facts and law, and explains why the combination of the two leads to the result. The
judge uses a law clerk as a research tool and sounding board, but clerks have no
significant role in drafting the opinion; there is no central staff. When the panel
reaches agreement on the opinion, it is published in a reporter accessible to

everyone. That is the traditional, or Learned Hand, model of appellate decision

making.

Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari,supra note 211, at 278 (footnotes omitted).
288. Coffey Comment, supranote 175, at 1.
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Two things about this passage are striking. First, the Seventh Circuit
judges refer to the citation of their own official actions as "throw[ing]" those
actions "back in [their] faces." In day-to-day parlance, when we refer to
something being "thrown back in our faces," that "something" is almost
invariably something unpleasant or embarrassing. Second, note the nature of
the "moral duty" cited by the judges. It is not a moral duty to act or not to act in
a particular way. Rather, it is a moral duty to take responsibility for one's
actions after those actions are called to one's attention. And, we are told, it is
imperative to prevent this moral duty from arising not by avoiding the actions
in the first place, but by prohibiting people from later mentioning them.
When litigants can cite unpublished opinions to a court, the court is left
with two real options. First, the court can decline to follow the unpublished
opinion and explain why-an explanation that will often have to include an
acknowledgment that the unpublished opinion was flawed. No judge likes to
eat crow. Second, the court can follow the unpublished opinion, and therefore
let itself be hemmed in by an opinion to which no judge may have given even a
few moments' attention. For judges aspiring to walk in Henry Friendly's
footsteps, it must be tempting to avoid this dilemma altogether by forbidding
parties from creating it.

